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Russian language was a stranger. I found him handsome, depressing, and difficult to read. 
There were French, German, and Czech and even Chinese but I somehow could not get him 
out of my mind. In his ugliness and harshness I see an unbearable sense of beauty. When we 
met again in a harsh winter in Saint Petersburg, he became disastrously romantic and 
monstrously embraceful. I guess I somehow fell in love with him and now he shall be my life 
long companion; it is a choice that I myself have made. 
	   	  1	  	  
 
Introduction 
Known as the “Mozart of Psychology”1, Lev Semionovich Vygotsky was born on the 5th 
of November 1896 in Orscha–a town in Belorussia–to a middle-class Jewish family. His father 
was a chief manager at the United Bank and his mother was a teacher. Being the second oldest 
among his eight siblings, Vygotsky had to help his parents to support the family financially. 
During that time in the Russian empire, there were strict limits on the choice of professions Jews 
could obtain, as well as the regions they could live in. Due to the limited positions and education 
opportunities available to the Jews, it was difficult for Vygotsky to get a standard formal 
education as a child. Hence, he was home schooled in a Jewish tradition (e.g. Reading the Torah 
in Hebrew, delivering speech at his Bar Mitsva). Vygotsky’s parents were highly respected 
members of the Jewish community in Gomel. They were well educated in many fields, they both 
spoke more than one language, and they had a network of professionals. He started out by 
studying privately with the mathematician Solmon Ashpiz, and young Vygotsky’s abilities 
enabled him to advance to the Jewish gymnasium where he was award a gold medal. While in 
high school, Vygotsky started to love poetry of Pushkin, Heine, Mandel’shtam and Pasternak, and 
he often visited the theatre to watch performances.  As an adolescent Vygotsky impressed many 
others as he quickly fell in with the local elite Jewish history study circle, where he encountered 
Hegelian theories for the first time. Vygotsky’s good friend Dobkin mentioned that Vygotsky was 
particularly active in discussing the idea of individual in history with other young intellectuals. 
David Vygotsky, his cousin who was several years older than Lev Vygotsky, introduced him to 
the world of language and translation by leading Vygotsky into the Esperanto movement, where 
linguists shared a common profession as translators of languages that were especially popular at 
that time, such as Spanish, Russian and Hebrew. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  reviewing	  Vygotsky’s	  “Mind	  and	  Society”,	  British	  psychologist	  Stephen	  Toulmin	  (1978)	  referred	  to	  Vygotsky	  as	  the	  Mozart	  of	  Psychology.	  Vygotsky	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  composer	  as	  an	  influential	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Vygotsky was very intrigued by Hegel’s view on human history as a part of the world’s 
history, and how ideas are constructed in different cultures within the historical processes. Hence, 
Vygotsky adopted Hegelian approaches on the formation of concepts and ideas, and how people 
develop these. He also appreciated Hegel’s interpretation of a link between a subject and an 
object, whereby they are both interrelated and none of them really has a priority over the other. In 
general, Vygotsky’s Hegelian philosophical direction is derived from their mutual interest in the 
connection between an individual, a society, and a culture. Hegel is seen as an important 
influence in many of Vygotsky’s works and his name often appears in Vygotsky’s analyses. 
Hegel’s influence motivated him to explore a wide range of topics throughout his years of 
education, and certainly guided Vygotsky towards the world of philosophy and psychology. 
Besides studying Hegel, Vygotsky had other academic interests such as languages and art. By the 
end of his high school education, he was able to read and speak German, Hebrew, French, 
English and Esperanto, as well as acquiring literacy in Latin and Greek. In addition to this, his 
love for art led him to theatre and literature. These talents served as a solid foundation to 
Vygotsky’s notion of the ideal occupation at that time–to become a teacher. However, this dream 
did not come true because this profession was “not meant to be” for the Jews. Hence he ended up 
turning into medicine as a profession and he was fortunate enough to get into Moscow 
University–which had an acceptance rate of 5% 2 at that time, where he studied law and 
philosophy. Ultimately, he ended up in Shvyavsky Public University where he further enhanced 
his knowledge in the fields of teaching and art. He took courses in logic, psychology, art, as well 
as theatre. Vygotsky graduated during the time of the Russian revolution, just as WW1 was 
ending, and all the educational institutions were completely shattered.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Before	  the	  Russian	  revolution,	  major	  cities	  such	  as	  Moscow	  and	  Saint	  Petersburg	  were	  under	  the	  Jewish	  education	  quota	  whereby	  only	  3-­‐5%	  of	  Jewish	  students	  are	  allowed	  for	  admission	  into	  Universities	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Russia.	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The disturbing onset of the hereditary tuberculosis hit Vygotsky in 1920, just when his 
career started to bloom. He became concerned about the progress and preservation of his work, 
going so far as to take immediate action to send his manuscripts to his mentor, Yuli Aichenwald 
in preparation for his “spontaneous” death. While he was concerned about his health, he did not 
abandon his dream of becoming a teacher. He taught adult education in Russian in Gomel for 
seven years, and continued to grow as an educator through his teaching experience in the 
psychology lab and the Teachers Training Institute.  
The field of psychology quickly advanced and that enabled Vygotsky focus more on his 
role as a theorist. Between 1921-1931, Vygotsky achieved a significant level of professional 
confidence as he began to capture the attention of some famous psychologists, who were 
impressed (among other things) by Vygotsky’s Marxist approach towards psychology, and his 
knowledge on the social interaction in human development. Being encouraged and supported by 
Alexander Luria and Alexei Leont’ev, Vygotsky regularly participated in both national and 
international conferences, where his professional network expanded extensively. He made his 
major “psychology debut” was at the meeting of the Second Psychological Congress in Leningrad 
in, where he gave his first important speech. This conference opened for him the doors to new 
spheres and he began to work with psychologists whose fields were related to his research. The 
flourishing of his career allowed him to travel around Europe, begin new projects, and complete 
his Ph.D. dissertation while co-authoring a number of books and articles with Luria. 
 Vygotsky had always kept his love for theatre in motion. He even made theatre a part of 
his career by co-directing films with Luria, in addition to carrying out seminars on art and film. 
Vygotsky was particularly interested in Konstantin Stanislavsky’s system of “perezhivanie”  
(переживание) that is the concept of bringing one’s experience onto the stage, as opposed to the 
concept of “predstavlenia” (представления) based on a simple representation of a character. 
Stanislavsky’s ideas corresponded to Vygotsky’s ideas of self, which he saw as the bridge that 
	   	  4	  	  
would lead to the study of emotion and linguistics through the portrayal of a subtext. This major 
theatrical concept contributed to Vygotsky’s linguistic analysis of the irregularities in our 
everyday language in comparison to metaphorical and poetic languages. In “Thinking and Speech” 
Vygotsky quoted Pushkin to say– “As rosy lips without a smile, Without grammatical errors, I 
will not love Russian language.” This reference reveals Vygotsky’s fascination with the 
complexity of a simple phrase, as its “real” underlying meaning might be entirely different from 
the speaker’s intention. With this interest in mind, he continued to explore the role of human 
consciousness– the subject that was of great interest to Vygotsky but which he was not able to 
pursue more deeply due to his worsening physiological condition. 
Vygotsky has always been respected as a scholar whose creativity is revealed throughout 
his ideas on education, language acquisition, and social communication. Today, Vygotsky’s 
theories continue to play an important role in educational systems in Europe and America. 
Several theories such as the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), Behaviorism, and his theories 
on pedagogy are particularly influential and well known because they are seen as useful cognitive 
“tools” in the process of evolving as an educated and developed person as well as understanding 
how society works. In “Educational Psychology”, Vygotsky mentioned, “The social environment 
is the true lever of the educational process, and the teacher's overall role is reduced to adjusting 
this lever. Just as a gardener would be acting foolishly if he were to try to affect the growth of a 
plant by directly tugging at its roots with his hands from underneath the plant, so the teacher is in 
contradiction with the essential nature of education if he bends all his efforts at directly 
influencing the student. But the gardener affects the germination of his flowers by increasing the 
temperature, regulating the moisture, varying the relative position of neighboring plants, and 
selecting and mixing soils and fertilizers, i.e., once again, indirectly, by making appropriate 
changes to the environment.” This idea where a teacher acts as an educator through the variation 
of the student’s environment, which then leads the student to grow beyond his existing comfort 
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zone. Vygotsky’s ideas have acquired historical and cultural significance but they were not 
readily accepted and approved by the Russian educators, who were focused on the concepts of 
“instruction” (obuchenie/обучение) and “upbringing”(vospitanie/воспитание). His theoretical 
contribution immediately provoked a battle over the educational methods in Russia because 
teachers, pedagogical institutes and students started to work together to transform their learning 
and teaching methods into a more interactive one.  
In the 30s, Vygotsky’s work was banned in USSR–for only a “certain kind” of 
psychology was approved by Stalin’s regime. In his last years, Vygotsky volunteered to work 
with refugees (1931) and disabled people along with Lenin’s widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya.  He 
did so because he knew that his life was coming to an end. In 1934, at the age of 34,Vygotsky 
died of tuberculosis, leaving behind him 10 books, including “Thinking and Speech” and 270 
seminal articles. His name only slowly gained popularity in Western Europe along with the 
development of the theories of some other psychologist such as Pavlov, Skinner, and Piaget. In 
1980, Lev Vygotsky’s works and ideas reached the USA, and they immediately attracted and 
inspired numerous psychologists, students, and educators.  
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Vygotsky and Others 
Vygotsky’s scholarly versatility paid off as his works gained access to fields related to 
child development, the role of culture, the relationship between language and thought, as well as 
the research of human consciousness. Over the years, Vygotsky’s works had serve as a 
foundation to a wide range of theories that had inspired many psychologists of various periods 
and schools. Due to the similarity of views, he was often associated with Jean Piaget, Karl Marx, 
Hegel, and William Stern.  The theories of Vygotsky that most significantly contributed to 
contemporary psychology were his theories on the Social Influences in “Cognitive Development”, 
“The Zone of Proximal Development”, and “Language and Thought”.  In addition to that, he 
contributed greatly to the studies of children’s learning capabilities in correlation with their 
environment. In fact, his theories are well practiced and shared throughout the world in the field 
of classroom pedagogy and all level of education. Vygotsky often placed the theoretical 
emphasizes on cooperative learning and “scaffolding”.3  As an educator, he also bridged the study 
of culture and child development through the exploration of a “different kind of empirical 
research.”  He was known among other psychologists for his unconventional views on the nature 
of empirical studies.  These views were presented in the form of analyses of the theories of other 
psychologists, whose ideas he found effective. Hence, besides being a psychologist, philosopher, 
a critic and an artist, Vygotsky also played a major role as a commentator on many analytical 
articles and books. He formally utilized these analyses and researches as references towards his 
arguments in polemics with phis fellow theorists. Many of his reviews and evaluations were 
concentrated on Karl Marx’s Social Theory, Jean Piaget’s Psychological Theory, Hegel’s 
Philosophical Theory, and William Stern’s Social Constructionism as he attempted to answer the 
question “What psychology do you study in Russia?” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Scaffolding	  is	  a	  psychological	  term-­‐introduced	  by	  Jerome	  Bruner-­‐that	  is	  frequently	  associated	  with	  Vygotsky’s	  theory	  of	  Zone	  of	  Proximal	  Development.	  It	  is	  described	  as	  a	  technique	  used	  by	  more	  experienced	  adults	  to	  guide	  younger	  children	  in	  their	  learning	  process.	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Lev Vygotsky has always been a longtime supporter of Karl Marx’s ideas and he often 
used Karl Marx’s social theory as a foundation of his own theories. In other words, Karl Marx 
was Vygotsky’s guide onto the path of behaviorism (human-object cultural contact), through the 
study of psychoanalysis and scientific methodology. Besides Karl Marx, Hegel, also played an 
important part in Vygotsky’s profession as a psychologist and philosopher. Hegel’s expertise on 
the subject of the roles of history, concept, and ideas that are knitted together within one’s 
cultural context fit into Vygotsky’s own cultural theories.  Like Hegel, Vygotsky supported the 
importance of culture in terms of how it shapes one’s thinking, depending on the nature of the 
subject matter. Due to his fascination by Hegel’s ideas Vygotsky prominently mentioned the 
German philosopher in his well-known book–“Thinking and Speech” (1934) in the last chapter 
titled “Thought and Word” (мысль и слово). When William Stern’s social constructionism was 
introduced, Vygotsky formed an opinion on Stern’s idea that the individuality is the true essence 
of personality and intelligence, not social construction. Stern became a powerful referee in 
Vygotsky’s writing, especially regarding Vygotsky’s analyses on children’s social behavior and 
language abilities that are consistently being shaped by their culture. Speaking of social behavior, 
the psychologist that has won the “most-compared to Vygotsky” award was none other than the 
renowned child psychologist Jean Piaget. Both Piaget and Vygotsky shared a very strong 
similarity on the question of children’s learning ability being heavily influenced by their learning 
environment. However, Piaget had been considered Vygotsky’s opponent because their 
perspectives also differ in many ways. Piaget is recognized for his description of the stages of 
child development. This contrasts Vygotsky’s emphasis on the cultural aspect of children’s’ 
cognitive development. This is because Vygotsky focused more on the specific social factors and 
especially the role of language, that he saw necessary for the understanding child cognition.  
Having this point of view in mind, Vygotsky strongly emphasized the irrelevance of Piaget’s 
experiments on his (Piaget’s) own children because his results were not representative. That 
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critical impulse prompted Vygotsky’s desire to test Piaget’s concept of egocentrism, and 
consequently, the roles of inner speech, outer speech, and egocentric speech.  
To Vygotsky, the differences and similarities between the ideas of the psychologists 
(Piaget, Hegel, Stern, etc.) were all essential in order to comprehensively explore human 
consciousness. In general he sought to examine human consciousness by exploring language and 
thought through empirical studies on child development. Hence, even though he was close to the 
end of his life, Vygotsky addressed all that he needed to in a series of seven chapters, which 
constitute his last and most famous book- “Thinking and Speech.” 
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“Thinking and Speech” by Lev Vygotsky, 1934 
In “Thinking and Speech”, Vygotsky aimed to explore thought and language through 
experimental investigation starting with the genetic analysis of thought and speech. The title of 
the book was changed several times. Its original title was “Thought and Language”, though in 
Russian the components of the title “Myshlenie i rech” (мышление и речь) itself meant the act of 
thinking and the noun “speech,” as opposed to the nouns “thought and language.” The questions 
were about what did Vygotsky actually have in mind when he gave the book the title, and how 
would the translators interpret his title?” This book is very complex not only because of the 
language Vygotsky used but also due to the fact that it is a critical discussion based study of a 
wide range of fields. In order to do this Vygotsky sequenced his range of studies into seven 
chapters. In these seven chapters Vygotsky addressed the challenges faced by psychology in 
general, in order to explore the nature of thought and language in depth. Many of those challenges 
emerged as a result of the methodological approaches that were used at that time. Vygotsky also 
made good use of the existing literature to demonstrate how the field of psycholinguistics and 
psychology had evolved and developed over the years. In general, his book greatly contributed to 
a new synthesis between the research psychology and the relationship between thought and 
language. Vygotsky also described the processes of child development in conformity with the 
formulation of concepts, and especially the role of written speech in relation to thinking. He 
believed that analyzing children’s speech development (inner speech, outer speech, and 
egocentric speech), it is possible to track their cognitive development. Moreover, their use of 
language (self-talk and identification of meaning) for communication also contributed to a clear 
understanding of a child’s thought. Of course ultimately, Vygotsky himself knew that due to the 
complex nature of thought and language, no one could possibly find a “right” and fully effective 
way to solve this problem because there are always too many issues that are left unaddressed or 
ignored by researchers.  Not surprisingly, this book sparked an ongoing debate between 
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psychologists because it covers many disciplines and human sciences. Ultimately, “Thinking and 
Speech” has successfully explored the changing relationship between the mental and verbal 
processes of thought and language through the study of the Western European philosophical, 
psychological, and linguistic concepts, as well as fostered Vygotsky’s own individual progress 
towards his theory of consciousness. 
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Chapter Seven, Thought and Word, and other chapters 
I chose to translate Chapter Seven because it is regarded the most important chapter in 
“Thinking and Speech.” It is a chapter where questions like “Does language mirror thought?”, 
“Does language shape thought?” are posed and answered. To a lot of authors who have been 
spending the major part of their career exploring Vygotsky’s extraordinary role as a “modern” yet 
“Soviet” psychologist, this chapter addresses the deepest concepts that are hidden under the 
blanket of the relationship between thought and language. In addition to that, it is also a chapter 
where Vygotsky illustrated the most difficult philosophical concepts with metaphors, as he made 
use of the flexibility of Russian syntax. He moves from one psychologist to the next and from one 
metaphor to the next, but still manages to keep all chapters in harmony with the main goal of the 
examination of thought and language.   For this reason, I chose to unify the brief summaries of 
chapters one through six into a more condensed yet thorough summary in chapter seven.  
“Thinking and Speech” can be broken down into the follow chapters: 
Chapter 1- Research methods and approaches to word and meaning 
Chapter 2/3 – A critique of Piaget’s and Stern’s child development theories 
Chapter 4- Trace of the genetic roots of thought and language  
Chapter 5- Development of word meaning in child 
Chapter 6- A comparative Study of child concept 
Chapter 7- A co-summary of chapter one through chapter six through the analysis of thought and     
word  
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Chapter seven is the final chapter and the introduction to the subject of consciousness.  
This chapter is the last written by Vygotsky before he died. By the end of Chapter seven, through 
the lenses of “Thinking and Speech,” we will be able to see the influences of Marx’s theory on 
Vygotsky’s experimental ideas about the historical and social context of child development. 
Vygotsky’s investigated many themes that include the basic act of thinking, speaking, 
and meaning. For example, Vygotsky described meaning, as the preconditioned revolutionary 
activity for language making instead of a language tool.  To answer more interrelated questions 
(which he did partially answer such as “What does language mean?” and “How is language 
completed in meaning?” Vygotsky poses a complex and detailed discussion of egocentric and 
social speech, as well as thought and meaning. His goal was not to simply address their difference, 
but to analyze their relationships separately, then place them along with each other. For example, 
he studied the notion of meaning in terms of the historical aspect of meaning making, and 
consequently, how this is related to object identification. To support this, he used his experiments 
on children’s linguistic learning abilities to emphasize the role of society in the process of 
meaning making. With this he laid a solid argument that children first learn how to make meaning, 
then proceed to assign the meanings to words in an organized manner. Through meaning, 
Vygotsky had successfully conveyed the influence of culture onto oneself in the detailed 
explanation of the notion of meaning. Throughout the summary of Chapter seven, many examples 
are provided, where he selected a concept which he saw as relevant to the development of thought 
and language, and thought several solid circumstances to support his argument. Due to the 
generality and diversity of concepts, the summary of Chapter seven is broken down into the sub 
analysis of three components- thought and word, language and thought, and speech planes.  
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Thought and word 
Vygotsky started his analysis of Thought and Word by describing them as a united entity. 
To turn our attention to the relationship between thought and word, he inserted a mediating 
concept, which is the concept of meaning. Vygotsky saw meaning as the explanatory unit of 
thought and word because the process of meaning making itself is a form of revolutionary 
development. The ability to form meaning defines us as humans as we practice dialectical 
thinking through collective intentions, our intentions, and the intentions of others. Word meaning 
(semantics), in this sense, was considered a significant sign of growth because it is the bridge 
between the cognitive mind and social development. In Vygotsky’s words, word meaning is not 
only the unit of thinking as speech; it is also a form of generalization. Generalization here is 
referring to human social interaction, which is considered the unity of thinking and 
communication.  
 Using the case of a child’s first word-meaning encounter, Vygotsky gave a simple 
example. In an experiment, a child was asked if it is possible to name a cow “ink,” and ink “cow.” 
The child gave a negative answer to this question because he understood the word “cow” as a 
living thing that gives milk, and an “ink” as something that people use to write with. Using the 
same logic, the child acknowledged a cow as “cow” because it has horns, and that a calf as “calf” 
because it has smaller horns than the cow, and a horse is not a cow because a horse does not have 
horns. The child demonstrated a movement of thought to word. Theoretically speaking, Vygotsky 
explained that the external (auditory) speech plane and the internal (semantic) speech plane must 
be studied, in order to understand this “movement” of thought to word completely. Working from 
the external speech plane, the child could listen, then deduce from a part to a whole. On the 
contrary, working from the external semantic point of view, he or she may first intuitively 
integrate a thought as a phrase, and then slowly break it down to separate words. Certainly, these 
actions are complex enough that the child himself cannot realize them, but the point is that, these 
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two planes exist and they are crucial for the discovery of the path from thought to word. Hence, 
Vygotsky noted that meaning is “The structure of speech does not simply mirror the structure of 
thought; that is why words cannot be put on by thought like a tailored garment” (1986, p.219). In 
addition to that, this experiment also demonstrated the crucial word-object relationship, whereby 
the word is inseparable from the object.  The mastery of a child’s ability to mentally dissect 
speech into these two planes can be considered as their mastery of the portioning of semantics 
and phonology. Similarly, once the child understood that the word does not necessarily relate to 
the characteristics of the object, then the child may be considered to have matured linguistically, 
and thus, be prepared to take into account the environment in which he uses his language.  
The conclusion Vygotsky gives to the role of meaning in the path from thought to word, 
is that meaning shows us how we learn from one another, and how we naturally adapt to each 
another on a daily basis, through language. Thus, meaning is necessary as a historically 
preconditioned learning phenomenon. The ideal way to understand the relationship between 
thought and word is to understand the mediating concept of meaning.   
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On the Translation: 
 
It is generally assumed that translation is simply an act of rewriting a piece of text from 
its original language to a target language. As an individual who started learning Russian three 
years ago, this project was by far the biggest test of my academic journey. Often times one might 
think that since I speak Malay, Chinese, English, and a little bit of French, adding Russian 
language to my “plate of languages” should not be a struggle. This might have been the case but 
the “struggle” came not from the language, but from the nature of translation itself. As Russian 
novelist and poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko once said “Translation is like a woman. If it is beautiful, 
it is not faithful. If it is faithful, it is most certainly not beautiful.” The act of translation itself 
requires more than just the words on the text. In this case, translation requires a mastery of both 
Russian and English to an extent where I can tackle the cultural, lexical, structural, and 
ambiguous aspect of both these languages. Disciplining myself to do research and understand the 
content of “Thinking and Speech” was not the main difficulty. The two most emotionally 
challenging yet rewarding struggles that I faced while completing this project can be broken 
down into two sub challenges.   
The first problem I had was the difficulty to work with the agglutinative and flexible 
nature of Russian while trying to be loyal to the Vygotsky’s intention and every single artistic 
aspect of the text. The second problem I encountered was a constant inability to stay focus on 
Vygotsky’s language because his sentences are long and at times confusing. These two problems 
definitely troubled my confidence as a translator and a language learner because I struggled with 
both the content and my main task, which is the translation itself. In my mind I was certain that 
these problems were challenging because I was working with two languages that were not my 
native languages. Though this was an obstacle, knowing different kinds of languages enabled me 
to draw comparisons between different language backgrounds in terms of finding a balance 
between the syntax and semantics of both Russian and English. Having additional language 
structures in my mind gives way to the multicultural proficiency and transparency of grammar 
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and idioms. In addition to that, I have never encountered a material as dense as this text, which 
Vygotsky himself had written.  
What makes this task almost unbearable yet fascinating is Vygotsky’s writing style.  The 
abundance of linguistic nuances and metaphors and untranslatable idioms (непереводимые-
‘neperevodimie’) exceeded my expectations of a typical academic text. By the end of the first 
page itself, I began to alter my way of thinking and writing in both English and Russian. There 
were linguistic “bombs” dropped on every possible aspect of both of these languages that it was 
almost harder to read Vygotsky’s work than to translate it. In addition to that, Vygotsky’s work as 
a psychologist, critic, and thinker required more clarification and focus on the meaning behind 
each sentence that he wrote. By the end of this project I could not rely on my sense of English as 
my target language to detect which sentences sounded wrong and which sounded right (in 
English) because I became too acquainted with Vygotsky’s style of writing. While working my 
way through this difficult path, I realized that the main challenge was not Russian, but the idea of 
transposing Russian into English while reducing the ambiguity of Vygotsky’s language. 
Vygotsky’s attempt to tackle the issues of thought and word in relation to scientists and literary 
figures (Dostoevsky, Piaget, Mandelshtam, etc.) explained his motivation to write an academic 
book with a mindset of a poetic psycholinguist. Writing about the process of thinking and 
speaking sparked some irony since it involves a more intense emphasis of the process of 
“thinking” and “speaking” itself. This meta-analytical effort of Vygotsky certainly made my task 
an intriguing and life-changing experience. However, his writing style (especially with reflexive 
verbs and long run on sentences) makes it harder for readers to penetrate into the core of the text 
because of its insufficient clarity increases the distance between Vygotsky’s text and his readers 
(or translators). There was a wide range of techniques and aspects of translation that I had to pay 
a good amount of attention to in order to solve certain translational problems that emerged. Most 
of my efforts were concentrated on the addition and subtraction of words, paraphrasing, and 
translations of metaphors. 
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I have chosen a few paragraphs in both Russian and English to highlight the linguistic challenges 
of this translation project. The italicized sentences are sentences that I have translated from the 
original Russian text.  
 
 1. В самом деле, сказать, что вода состоит из водорода и кислорода, значит сказать 
нечто такое, что одинаково относится ко всей воде вообще и ко всем ее свойствам в 
равной мере: к Великому океану в такой же мере, как к дождевой капле, к свойству 
воды тушить огонь в такой же мере, как к закону Архимеда. 
 
Indeed, to say that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen is to say nothing similar to all 
which applies to water in general as well as all of its consistent properties: to the great 
ocean in the same degree as to a rain drop, to the water’s ability to extinguish fire, in the 
same extent as to Archimedes’ law. 
 
This sentence is an example of how Vygotsky makes use of Russian’s dative case by 
introducing a new category. It is not common in English to simply put “to” in front of the 
beginning of each clause. It is also not common to use the phrase “is to say nothing 
similar to all that applies”. The usage of “that which” is very common in Russian. In 
American English, it brings out formality. Vygotsky also that flooded each paragraph 
with many transitional devices (conjunctive adverbs). This may easily confuse readers as 
he overemphasized on the introduction of what had been said earlier instead of starting 
off his sentence with a new argument.  
   
 2. Речь по своему строению не представляет собой простого зеркального отражения 
строения мысли. Поэтому она не может надеваться на мысль, как готовое платье. 
 
Speech, by its own structure, does not present itself as a simple mirror reflection of the 
structure of thought. Hence, it cannot be worn on thought like a tailored dress. 
 
This paragraph is an example of reformulation and transposition where I had to a 
highlight the importance of the role of speech. In English “because” is not allowed to be 
placed at the beginning of the sentence, which is why “hence” is used instead. Another 
interesting fact about this sentence is that Vygotsky is describing the characteristics of 
speech and how it cannot simply be put on as a piece of clothing. In a way, he personifies 
speech. “tailored dress” might be confusing because it literally means “prepared dress”. 
There are other variants of the word “made” in Russian and I came across some 
translations that simply omitted this important word and replaced the whole phrase with 
“clothing” or “garment.” I chose “tailored dress” because I believe that Vygotsky’s goal 
was to present the analogy whereby a dress may be put together by separated parts and it 
can be pre-made in a specific way, otherwise he could have chosen the word “clothing” 
or “garment” in Russian, instead of specifically referring to a “dress”.  
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   3. Анализ слова мог бы показать, что это несовпадение грамматики и логики в 
развитии детской речи опять, как и в прежнем случае, не только не исключает их 
единства, но, напротив, только оно и делает возможным это внутреннее единство 
значения. 
 
The analysis of the word may demonstrate that this grammatical and logical mismatch in 
a child’s speech once again–as it was in the previous case–not only does it not exclude 
their unity but instead, it is the only one that makes the internal unity of meaning and the 
word that expresses the complicated logical relationship, possible.  
 
This sentence is an example of antonymic translation; sentence fragmentation and 
sentence integration whereby I had to split up or conjoin sentences together in order to 
preserve the meaning of the sentence. The hyphens here show a case of interjection rather 
than a comma. There is also a trick in the double negative and opposing statement that 
occurs in a very rare occasion. For example, the phrases “does not only not exclude their 
unity” and “but, on the contrary, it is the only one that does” make sense in Russian, but 
for it to make sense in English, I have to either translate part of a clause without negation 
and omit a detail, or switch a word-order. Vygotsky also uses a lot of double negative 
phrases that are common construction of Chinese “ I need to go" "我不得不走" (Wǒ 
bùdébù zǒu) and French “rien”. For example in Russian it is acceptable to say “ We 
cannot not talk about this.” “Мы не можем не поговорить об этом.” However, these 
two sentences could be translated as “I had to go” or “We have to talk about this” 
because “cannot not” in this case does not imply that one cannot talk about something, 
but it is rather used as an emphasis on the urgency of the action. 
 
 4. Небезразлично, думается нам, говорю ли я себе или другим. 
 
It makes a difference as we think of whether we are talking to ourselves or to others. 
 
This sentence is a clear example of structural change and commentary. The Russian 
original of this sentence literally translates “It makes a difference, we think (reflexive 
form) whether we speak to myself or to others.” There are many similar cases in the rest 
of this chapter whereby the common usage of reflexive verbs in Russian require a 
structural change and a subsequent commentary towards a particular phrase in English so 
that readers would not get lost. For example, my initial impression of this sentence is that 
I wonder if we talk to others or ourselves when we talk, rather than we, as human beings 
think: “do I talk to myself or to others.” It forces me to pose a question in both languages 
to see which one corresponds better.  
 5. «Вот», — сказал он и написал начальные буквы: «К, В, М, О, Э, Н, М, Б, 3, Л, Э, Н, 
И. Т». Буквы эти значили: «Когда вы мне ответили: этого не может быть, значило 
ли это никогда или тогда?» 
 
“Now,”- he said and wrote the beginning letters: W,Y A, M: T, I, N, P, D , I, M, A, T, O,N 
?” 
These words mean “ When you answered me: This is not possible. 
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“Did it mean anything then or ever? ” 
 
This paragraph is one of the most interesting to translate because the paragraph itself 
describes how one person has to guess what another is saying by only revealing the initial 
letter. It is also an except from Anna Karenina by Leo Tolstoy, from which Vygotsky 
quoted. The techniques used here are compensation, compression, and modulation 
whereby I have to paraphrase or completely come up with the closest possible meaning. 
The word  “Vot” or “Вот” in Russian could mean “Here” or “Now”. It is a short word 
but yet it functions as a distractor or transitional device. The last two sentences could be 
understood as “when you answered me that this is not possible, did it mean something 
then or did it ever mean anything, ever?” However, since my goal was to keep the 
dialogue parallel, I shrunk this phrase into a more straightforward phrase that I think 
carries the closest meaning. My goal was to achieve a certain balance between how a 
dialogue should look, the amount of words used in a dialogue, as well as the meaning 
each word weighed. 
 6. Сознание отображает себя в слове, как солнце в малой капле вод. Слово   
относится к сознанию, как малый мир к большому, как живая клетка к организму, 
как атом к космосу. Оно и есть малый мир сознания. Осмысленное слово есть 
микрокосм человеческого сознания. 
 
Consciousness displays itself in the word, as the sun does in the small drops of water. 
The word is related to consciousness, as the small word is to the bigger word, as the 
living cell is to the organism, as the atom to the cosmos. It is the small word of 
consciousness. The meaningful word is the microorganism of human consciousness. 
 
This paragraph is an example of literal translation where word order and word sequence 
in both versions are in the same. The only change here a grammatical change. The 
meaning is reflected in a straightforward manner. This was also the final paragraph of the 
chapter. 
 
In general, Vygotsky’s uses of run on sentences, commas, and words that created 
ambiguity (“Emergence” Возникование,“Dismembering” Расчленять) and his intensive use 
of repetition and constant reference to concepts that he had previously mentioned may easily 
lose my focus as a reader. I inserted a number of ellipses to draw readers’ attention to 
Vygotsky’s main arguments, as I believed that it reduces ambiguity. To tackle the linguistic 
differences between English and Russian, mainly grammar and syntax, the techniques that 
were frequently used were omission, generalization, transposition, literal translation, and 
modulation. In addition to those that are described above, these techniques were used to 
achieve coherence and cohesion as well as increase readers’ accessibility towards Vygotsky’s 
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intentions as an author. Though challenging, this project enabled me to greatly both my 
Russian and English language skills to the level of my native languages; nothing but the most 
rewarding learning process as a college senior and a language learner. 
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Thinking and Speech. Lev Vygotsky 1934 
 
Chapter 7 Thought and Word 
 
“I forgot the word that I wanted to say, and the unbodied thought will return to the hall of 
shadows.” 
O.E. Mandelshtam, The Swallow 
  
We began our research with an attempt to clarify the internal relationship that exists 
between thought and word in the most extreme stages of phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
development. We found that the beginning of the development of thought and word, the 
prehistoric period in the existence of thinking and speech, does not show any definite 
relationships and dependencies between the genetic roots of thought and word. Thus, it appears 
that the inner relationship between word and thought that concerns us is neither primordial, nor is 
it a pre-given value which appears to be a precondition, foundation, and starting point for all 
further development. Instead they themselves arise and are formed only in the process of the 
historical development of human consciousness. They do not appear to be a precondition but the 
product of the formation of mankind. Even at the supreme point of animal development (the 
anthropoids), the speech, which is quite humanlike in the phonetic relations, is not in any way 
related to the (also the anthropoid’s) intellect. In the initial stage of child development we may 
undoubtedly ascertain the presence of pre-intellectual stage in the process of speech formation 
and the preverbal stage in the development of thinking. Thought and word are not inherently 
related to each other. This bond emerges, changes, and grows in the course of the very 
development of thought and word. 
	   	  22	  	  
However, at the same time it would be incorrect, as we have attempted to clarify at the 
very beginning of our research, to represent thought and speech as two external processes with 
respect to one another, as two independent forces that flow and function parallel to each other or 
that intersect in some points of their respective paths and fall into a mechanical interaction. The 
absence of a primal connection between thought and word does not in any way indicate that this 
connection can only emerge as an external connection of two essentially different types of 
activity of our consciousness. On the contrary, as we tried to demonstrate in the very beginning of 
our work, the basic methodological flaws of the vast body of research on thinking and speech are 
the flaws that stimulated the fruitlessness of these works and the flaws that consist precisely in 
this understanding of the relationship between thought and word that consider both these 
processes as two independent, separate and isolated elements, where verbal thinking, with all of 
its inherent properties, emerges from their external unification.  
 We have attempted to show that the method of analysis that flows out of this 
understanding appears to be a failure from the outset as it dissolves this whole into its forming 
elements, in order to explain the properties of verbal thinking, to speech and thinking that do not 
contain the characteristics that are inherent to the whole. It thereby denies itself a path ahead 
towards the explanation of these properties. We compared the researcher who uses this method to 
one who decomposes water into hydrogen and oxygen in attempt to explain why water 
extinguishes fire. Surprisingly he observed that oxygen sustains combustion, while hydrogen 
itself is combustible. We continued to show further, that the analysis that uses the method of 
dissolution of elements is not essentially the analysis in the purest sense of the word but in terms 
of its application to the solution of concrete problems in any particular area of the phenomena. 
Instead, this is a raising of the phenomenon to a more general level rather than the inner 
partitioning of the phenomenon that is the underlying explanation. By its own nature this method 
leads more towards a generalization than it does to an analysis. Indeed, to say that water consists 
of hydrogen and oxygen is to say nothing similar to all which applies to water in general as well 
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as all of its consistent properties: to the great ocean in the same degree as to a rain drop, to the 
water’s ability to extinguish fire, in the same extent as to Archimedes’ law. Precisely in the same 
way, to say that verbal thinking contains intellectual processes and speech functions (themselves), 
is to say something that is related to verbal thinking as a whole and to all of its separate properties 
in the same extent. It therefore means that it is to say nothing regarding each particular problem 
that is faced by the research of verbal thinking. 
Hence, we tried to embark on a new point of view from the beginning by assigning to the 
whole problem a different direction and applying a different method of analysis in the research. 
We attempted to replace the analysis, which is based on the method of dissolution into elements, 
with the analysis that separate the complicated whole of verbal thinking into units, understanding 
by these latter(s) the kinds of products of the analysis that form the initial aspects of the moments 
not in relation to phenomenon as a whole, but only in relation to its separate concrete aspects and 
properties. Furthermore, similarly, in the distinction from the elements, they do not lose the 
properties that are inherent to the whole and the properties that are subjected to the explanation. 
Instead, they contain in the most simple and primitive form, the properties of the whole, for 
whose sake the experiment is undertaken. The unit, towards which we come into the analysis, 
contains the simplest form of properties that are inherent to the verbal thinking as a whole. 
We found this unit, which reflects the unity of thinking and speech in the simplest form, 
in the meaning of a word. The meaning of word, as we have tried to show previously, presents 
itself as a unit of both processes that cannot be further deconstructed. That is, we cannot say that 
it (the meaning of a word) is the phenomenon of speech or the phenomenon of thinking. A word, 
deprived of meaning, is not a word, but an empty sound. Therefore, meaning is the necessary, 
constituting attribute of the word itself. It is the word itself, observed from the inside. Therefore 
we seem to be in the right to reasonably consider it as the phenomenon of speech. However, from 
the psychological aspect the meaning of word, as we have repeatedly seen throughout the 
research, is nothing other than a generalization or a concept. The generalization and meaning of 
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word are synonyms in essence. Any generalization, any form of a concept is the most specific, the 
most genuine, and the most unquestionable act of thought. Therefore, we are correct in regarding 
the meaning of word as the phenomenon of thinking.  
Thus, the meaning of a word turns out to be a speech phenomenon and an intellectual 
phenomenon simultaneously, wherein it does not simply indicate its external co-existence with 
two different forms of mental life. The meaning of word is the phenomenon of thinking only in 
the sense in which thought is related to the word and when thought is embodied in word, and vice 
versa: it is the phenomenon of speech only to the extent that speech is related to thought and is 
illuminated by it. It is the phenomenon of verbal thought or the phenomenon of the meaningful 
word. It is the unity of word and thought. It seems to us that this basic thesis of our research as a 
whole is barely needed in the new confirmations after all that were mentioned above.  
It seems to us that our experimental research completely confirmed and justified this 
thesis, having shown that while operating with the meaning of word as a unit of verbal thinking, 
we actually find the real possibility of the concrete research of the development of verbal thinking 
and the explanation of its leading features at various stages. However, the main result of all of our 
research is not the thesis itself, but that which we found further in the research itself, as its most 
important and central conclusion. That which is new and most significant, which introduces the 
study of thinking and speech, is the discovery of the development of the meaning of words. The 
discovery of the change of word meaning and its development is our main discovery that allowed 
us to overcome the postulate of the consistency and unchangability of word meaning which lay in 
the foundation of the previous studies of thinking and speech for the first time. From the 
perspective of traditional psychology, the connection between word and meaning is a simple 
associative connection that is established by virtue of multiple correspondences in the 
consciousness of the impression from a word and of the impression from a thing that the word 
denotes. The word reminds one of its meaning as the coat of a familiar person reminds one of the 
person, or as the external view of the house reminds one of those who live in it. From this point of 
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view, once the meaning of word is established, it cannot at all develop, nor can it change. 
Association, connecting word and meaning, may be strengthened or weakened, and it 
may be enriched through the connections with the objects of the same kind. It may also be 
extended by means of the similarity and adjacency to a wider circle of objects. Either that, or 
likewise, it may be narrow or expand this circle. In other words, it may undergo a series of 
quantitative and outer changes, but it cannot change its internal psychological nature because in 
order for that to happen, it has to stop being what it is, which is association. […] 
First of all, our analysis leads us to the differentiation of planes in the speech itself. 
Though the research shows that through the internal, meaningful, semantic aspect of speech and 
the external, auditory, phasic aspect of speech forms a complete unity, they each possess their 
own unique laws of movement. The unity of speech is a complex unity, and not a homogenous 
and uniform one. To begin with, the presence of its movement in the semantic and phasic path of 
speech is discovered in the whole series of factors that lead to the formation of the child’s verbal 
development. We will only specify two of the main factors. 
It is known that the external aspect of speech is developed in the child from a word to a 
chain of two or three words, followed by a simple phrase, then to a chain of phrases, and – even 
later– to the related speech which consists of a series of complex sentences. In this sense, the 
child goes into the mastering of the phasic aspect of speech from parts to a whole. However, we 
also know that in terms of its own meaning, the first word of the child is a whole phrase-a single 
complex sentence. In the development of the semantic aspect of speech, the child begins from the 
whole, the sentence. Only later then, he moves to the mastering of the particular meaningful units, 
meanings of separate words, dismembering his own thought that is fused and expressed in a one-
word sentence, into a series of separate series that are connected between the verbal meaning 
themselves. Thus, if we cover the initial and final moment in the development of the semantic and 
phasic aspects of speech, it may be easily verified that this development occurs in opposing 
directions. The meaningful aspect of speech develops from a whole to a part, from a sentence to 
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word, while the outer aspect of speech goes from a part to a whole, from a word to a sentence. 
 This very fact itself is already sufficient to convince us of the necessity to distinguish 
between the direction of meaningful and auditory aspect of speech. The direction in this plane and 
the other do not correspond to each other, merging into a single line. As shown in the case we 
have observed, they may take place in opposite directions. However, this certainly does not imply 
that there is a gap between both speech planes that are autonomous and independent of each of its 
two sides. On the contrary, the differentiation between both these planes is the first and necessary 
step for the establishment of the inner unity of the two verbal planes. This unity proposes that 
each of the two aspects of speech has its own direction and a complex relationship between both 
these directions. However, it is only possible to study the relationship that lies on the basis of the 
unity of speech with the aid of the analysis of the differentiation of its paths, between which these 
complex relationships can only then exist. If both of these aspects of speech presented themselves 
as identical, corresponding with each other and merging into one line, then it would not be 
possible to speak about any kind of relationships on the internal side of speech because it is 
impossible to have a relationship between a thing and itself. In our example, this inner unity of 
both these sides of speech, having an opposing direction in the process of child development, acts 
with no lesser clarity than their discrepancy with one another. Initially, the thought of a child was 
born as a vague and disassociated whole, which is precisely why he has to find his own 
expression in the part of the speech in a separate word. It is as though a child chooses the size of 
the verbal garment for his thought. To the extent that the child’s thought is dismembered and 
moved to the constitution of separate parts, is the extent of which the child moves from parts to a 
dismembered whole in speech. Conversely, to the extent of which the child moves in speech from 
parts to a disassociated whole to a sentence, he may move from a dismembered whole to parts in 
thought. Thus, from the very beginning, thought and word do not appear to occur in one form. In 
a sense, it can be said that between them exists more of an opposition than an agreement. Speech, 
by its own structure, does not present itself as a simple mirror reflection of the structure of 
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thought. Hence, it cannot be worn on thought like a tailored dress. Speech does not serve as the 
expression of a developed thought. Thought, turning into speech, is restructured and reformed. 
Thought is not expressed but committed in word. Hence, the opposite directions of the process of 
the development of the meaningful and auditory aspects of speech form a true unity precisely 
because of its opposing directions. Another fact that is no less important refers to the later phase 
of development. As we remembered, Piaget established that the child masters the complex 
structure of the subordinate sentence with the conjunctions such as “because,” “despite,” “since,” 
“although,” rather than the meaningful structures that correspond with these syntactic forms. The 
grammar in the child’s development occurs ahead of his logic. The child who absolutely correctly 
and adequately applies the conjunctions that express the causal, temporal, adversative, conditional 
and other dependencies, in his own spontaneous speech and in the corresponding situation, and 
also throughout the course of the schooling age, is not aware of the semantic aspect of these 
conjunctions. He is not able to randomly use them. This means that the direction of the semantic 
and phasic aspects of the word in the mastering of complex syntactic structures does not 
correspond in the development. The analysis of the word may demonstrate that this grammatical 
and logical mismatch in a child’s speech once again–as it was in the previous case–not only does 
it not exclude their unity but instead, it is the only one that makes the internal unity of meaning 
and the word that expresses the complicated logical relationship possible. The lack of 
correspondence of the semantic and phasic sides of speech acts less indirectly but more vividly in 
the functional development of thought. In order to discover this, we have to move our own 
analysis from the genetic plane to a functional one. However, we must first note the existing facts 
that we highlighted from the genesis of speech allowed us to draw several significant conclusions 
in the functional relationship. If, as we observed, the development of the meaningful and auditory 
aspects of speech occurs in opposing directions throughout early childhood, then it is completely 
understood that in each occurring moment, no matter where, we will not be able to detect a 
correlation of these two speech planes. No complete correspondence can ever be proven between 
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them. However, more illustrative facts can be derived directly from the functional analysis of 
speech. These facts are well known to the modern form of psycholinguistics. Out of all the series 
of relevant facts, the lack of correspondence of the grammatical and psychological subject and 
predicate has to be situated in the first place. […] 
The lack of correspondence of the grammatical and psychological subject and predicate 
may be even more distinctively clarified in the next example. Let us take the phrase “The clock 
fell,” in which “the clock”– subject, “fell” – predicate. We imagine to 
ourselves that this phrase is used in two different situations and subsequently, it expresses 
two different thoughts in this one form. I turn my attention to the situation whereby the clock has 
stopped and I ask, how did this happen. They answered me: “The clock fell.” In this case, to my 
knowledge there was an introduction about the clock earlier. In this situation, the clock is the 
psychological subject that is being discussed. The presentation of the fact that the clock fell 
comes second. “Fell” in this current situation is the psychological predicate, that is said about the 
subject. In this case the grammatical and psychological division of the phrases correspond, 
though it may not necessarily respond. 
 Working at the desk, I hear a noise from a falling object and ask what fell. I am answered 
with this very phrase: “ The clock fell.” In this case, there was a representation of the act of 
falling in the consciousness before. “Fell” here is that which is discussed in this phrase–the 
psychological subject. That which is being said about the subject, the second thing that arises into 
awareness, is the presentation of the clock, which will be the psychological predicate in the 
current situation. In fact, this thought could be expressed as: “What fell was the clock.” In this 
scenario both the psychological and grammatical predicate would coincide. They did not 
correspond in our given situation. The analysis demonstrates that in the complex phrase, any part 
of the sentence may be a psychological predicate, and will bear the logical emphasis. The 
semantic function of this logical emphasis is exactly the isolation of the psychological predicate. 
Paulhan says “The grammatical category is, to a certain extent, presented as the fossilization of 
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the psychological category.” Hence, it needs to be revived by a logical emphasis that brings out 
its semantic structure. Paulhan demonstrated how the most spiritually originally-diverse opinion 
can be hidden behind this one very grammatical structure. Perhaps the correspondence between 
the grammatical and psychological structures does not happen as often as we think they would. In 
actuality, it might even be simply postulated by us and perhaps it rarely or never occurs. 
Everywhere– in phonetics, morphology, lexicon, and semantics, even in rhythm, metrics, and 
music–the psychological categories are hidden behind the grammatical or formal categories. If, in 
one case, they apparently correspond with one another, then they will diverge again in other 
cases. Not only can we speak of the psychological elements of forms and meanings, but with the 
psychological subjects and predicates, with the very same logic we could also speak of the 
psychological number, gender, case, pronouns, superlatives and tenses, etc. Along with the 
grammatical and formal understanding of the subject, the predicate and the gender we have to 
permit the existence of their psychological counterparts, or preimages. That which appears to be a 
mistake from a linguistic point of view may have an artistic value if it emerges from a distinctive 
nature. In the words of Pushkin: “Like rosy lips without a smile, I do not like Russian speech 
without grammatical errors.” This has a more profound meaning than we usually think. The 
complete elimination of the incongruities for the benefit of the common and undoubtedly correct 
expression can only be found in mathematics. Apparently, Descartes was the first person that saw 
that this kind of thinking in mathematics has originated from language, but nevertheless surpassed 
it. The first person who saw thinking as an origin of language, but has nonetheless been surpassed 
it, was apparently Descartes. Only one thing can be said: in its grammatical oscillation and in its 
psychological incongruity, our common conversational language is in the state of the dynamic 
equilibrium between the ideals of the mathematical and imaginative harmony, in the continuous 
movement, which we call evolution. If all these examples were shown by us in order to 
demonstrate the lack of correspondence of the phasic and semantic aspects of speech, then 
altogether they show that this lack of correspondence of word not only does not exclude this 
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unity, but on the contrary, it proposes this unity with certainty. Since this lack of correspondence 
does not interfere with the existence of thought in word, it appears to be a necessary condition in 
order for the movement from word to thought to be realized. […] In the fable “The Dragonfly and 
the Ant,” Krylov substituted the dragonfly for La Fontaine’s grasshopper, giving it the 
inapplicable epithet “the jumper.” In French, the word grasshopper is feminine. It is therefore 
quite suitable to embody the female frivolity and carelessness in his form. However, in Russian, 
in the translation “the grasshopper and the ant,” this meaningful tone in the image of frivolity 
inevitably vanishes. Hence, Krylov has prevailed the grammatical gender onto the real meaning- 
the grasshopper appeared to be the dragonfly, nevertheless preserved all the features of the 
grasshopper (jumping, singing) even though the dragonfly does not jump nor sing. The adequate 
translation of the complete sense demanded an indispensable preservation and the grammatical 
category of the feminine gender for the hero of the fable. […] 
If the phasic and semantic aspects of speech do not correspond, it is obvious that verbal 
utterance cannot immediately grow to its maximum since the semantic and verbal syntax grow, as 
we saw, not at the same time and not together, but instead imply a transition and a direction from 
one to the other. However, this complex process of the transition from meaning to sound itself 
develops, forming one of the basic lines in completion of verbal thinking. This division of speech 
into semantics and phonology is not directly given from the very beginning but it arises only in 
the course of the development: children must differentiate both forms of speech and recognize 
their differences and each of their natures in order to make the descent down the steps, which is 
naturally assumed in the active process of meaningful speech possible. We initially encounter a 
child’s unawareness of verbal forms and meanings and the lack of differentiation between them. 
The word and its auditory structure is perceived by the child as part of a thing or as its property, 
inseparable from its other properties. Apparently, this is a phenomenon that is inherent to any 
given primitive linguistic consciousness. 
 Humboldt provides the anecdote that talks about a peasant, whom, while listening to the 
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conversation of the astronomy students talking about stars, turned to them with the question: “ I 
understand that with the aid of all devices, people have succeeded in measuring the distance from 
Earth to the most distant stars and knew their distribution and movement. However, I would like 
to know how did they knew of the names of the stars?” He presumed that the names of the stars 
may only be known from the stars themselves. Simple experiments with children demonstrate that 
while at a preschool age, children can explain  the name of the objects as their properties: “ a cow 
is called a cow because it has horns, “a calf” because it has smaller horns, “a horse”– because it 
has no horns, “a dog” because it has no horns and it is small, “a car”- “because it is not an animal 
at all. ” 
The question of whether or not a name of one object may be changed to another, for 
example, to name a cow an ink, while an ink a cow, the children answered that this is completely 
impossible because we write with ink while “cow” gives milk. The characteristics of the thing 
and its name are so closely and inseparably related between each other that to transfer the name 
of one thing almost means to transfer the very property of one thing onto the other. The difficulty 
of the child to transfer the name of one thing onto the other is visible through the experiments in 
which the conditions of the names of the object were established with false names based on the 
instructions. In the experiment, the names cow and dog as well as window and ink were 
interchanged. A child was asked: “If the dog has horns, does the dog give milk?” “It gives.” said 
the child. “Does the cow have horns?” –“It does.” –“The cow– it is a dog, but perhaps the dog has 
a horn?”–“Of course, once a dog is a cow, once it is called a cow, then there have to be horns. 
Once it is called a cow, it means that there have to be horns. As for the dog, which is called a 
cow, there must certainly be small horns.” […] 
` On one hand, the denotation of word is expressed more clearly and strongly in the child, 
compared to the one that is expressed in an adult: to a child, a word represents part of a thing, one 
of its properties; it is immeasurably more closely related with the objects, compared to the word 
of an adult. This determines a greater relative weight of denotation in the words of children. On 
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the other hand, due to the exact fact whereby in the child’s perspective the word is related more 
closely to the object in comparison to us, the word is presented as a part of a thing. It is easier for 
the child than for the adult to isolate the word from the object and replace it independently of 
thoughts and to live an independent life. In this sense, the child initially does not differentiate the 
verbal meaning and the object, the meaning and the auditory form of the word. In the course of 
the development this differentiation occurs in the extent of the development of the generalization, 
and in the end of the development, where we already encounter the original concepts, all these 
complex relationships emerge between the separated speech plans that we talked about earlier. 
This differentiation of the two planes that expands over the years is accompanied by the 
development of the path that breaks through a thought upon the transformation of the syntax of 
meaning into the syntax of words. Thought imprints a logical emphasis onto 
one of its word phrases, isolating the psychological predicate with it, without which 
any given phrase will be incomprehensible. Speaking demands the transition from the 
internal plan to the external plan, while understanding proposes the reverse direction form the 
outer plan of speech towards the inner plane. We must take one more step on the path we have 
charted, and penetrate even deeper into the inner aspect of speech. The semantic speech plane is 
only the beginning and first of all of its inner planes. Behind the semantic plane, before the 
research, lies the plane of inner speech. Without the correct understanding of the psychological 
nature of inner speech there will not be any kind of possibility to clarify the relationship of 
thought to word in all of their actual complexity. However, this problem is presented as perhaps 
the most confusing out of all the questions that related to the study of thinking and speech. Hence, 
is worthy of a completely special research but we cannot avoid addressing some basic data of this 
particular research of inner speech since we would not be able to represent the relationship of 
thought to word without them. 
The confusion begins with the unclear terminology. The term “inner speech,” or 
“endophasia,” is applied in scientific literature to the most diverse phenomena. From this arises 
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the whole series of misunderstandings as the researchers often argue about different things, 
naming them with the same term. There is no possibility to bring our knowledge of the nature of 
inner speech into any kind of system if earlier on there was no 
attempt to introduce the terminological clarification into question. Since this task has 
not yet been done by anyone, it is not surprising that until now we do not have a single 
author of any kind of systematic theory, describing even the simplest factual data regarding the 
nature of inner speech. Apparently, the initial meaning of this term was the understanding of 
inner speech as verbal memory. One can recite a learnt poem by heart but one can reproduce it 
only in memory. The word may also be substituted by the representation about it or the form of 
memory, as the case of any other given object. In this case, inner speech differs from outer speech 
in the same way as the representation of the object differs from the real object. Precisely in this 
sense the French authors understood inner speech in their studies of the forms of memory, 
through which the reproduction of the word is realized (i.e., autistic, optical, motoric, or synthetic 
images). As we will see below, verbal memory represents one of the features that define the 
nature of inner speech. However, of course, not only does memory alone not deplete this concept, 
but also it does not even directly correspond to it. We also find the sign of equality between the 
reproduction of words by memory and inner speech among the traditional authors. In fact, these 
are two different processes that should be differentiated. 
The second meaning of inner speech is related with the reduction of the common verbal 
act. In this case inner speech is called unpronounced, silent, and mute speech, which is speech 
minus sound, by Miller’s definition. According to Watson’s characterization, inner speech 
presents itself as outer speech, but only as an incompletion of it. Bekhterev defined it as a non-
manifestation in the movement of the part of speech reflex, while Sechenov defined it as reflex 
that is broken into two thirds along its course. Hence, this understanding of inner speech may be 
included into one of the subordinate features in the scientific concept of inner speech. As the 
previous one, it does not deplete the whole of this concept, nor does it correspond to it at all. To 
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mutely pronounce any kind of word still does not, in any manner, signify the processes of inner 
speech. More recently, Schelling proposed to terminologically delineate inner speech and inner 
speaking, denoting with this previous term the content that was just discovered in inner speech by 
the aforementioned authors. From inner speech, this concept is separated quantitatively so that it 
only has the active part of the speech but not the processes of speech activity in mind. It is 
qualitatively separated so that it initially works with the motor activity of speech functions. Inner 
speaking, from this point of view, is the partial function of inner speech, speech-motor act of the 
initial character, the impulse that is not completely expressed in articulatory movements or that 
which is manifested in the movements that are expressed silently and vaguely, but which can yet 
accompany, reinforce, or inhibit the cognitive function.  
 In the end, the third and most vague of all understandings of this term gives inner speech 
an extremely broad interpretation of the concept. We will not stop on its history but we will 
briefly illustrate its contemporary condition, with which we have encountered in the works of 
many authors. […] The correct understanding of inner speech must precede from the theory 
whereby inner speech is a basic formation by its psychological nature, a basic form of speech 
activity, having its own specific features and consisting of the complex relationship towards other 
forms of speech activities. In order to study these relationships of inner speech, on one hand 
towards thought, and on the other, towards word, it is necessary to first find its specific 
differences from both thought and word then clarify its completely unique function. It is not the 
same, I think, whether I am talking to myself or to others. Inner speech is a speech for oneself. 
External speech is the speech for others. It should not even be presumed that this core and 
fundamental difference in the functions of both kinds of speeches to remain without 
consequences for the structural nature of both speech functions. […] The matter here is not a 
matter of vocalization. The very presence or absence of vocalization is not the reason that 
explains the nature of inner speech to us but the research that stems from this nature. In a way, it 
can be said that inner speech is not only that, which follows outer speech or that, which is 
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reproduced in memory, but the opposite to the outer speech. Outer speech is the process of the 
transfer of thought to word, its materialization and objectification. Here–the opposing process that 
occurs from the outside towards the inside is the process of the vaporization of speech into 
thought. This is the origin of the structure of this speech with all its differences from the structure 
of outer speech. 
Perhaps inner speech presents itself as the most difficult form of psychological research. 
Precisely because of this, we find a large amount of completely arbitrary and speculative 
constructions in the study of inner speech and we do not have any possible factual data. The 
experiment towards this problem is carried out demonstratively. The researchers attempted to 
grasp the existence of the central field of inner speech which is merely notable–in best case–
three-staged by its own significance and in any case that which lies outside of the central field of 
inner speech of the relating motor changes in articulation and respiration. This problem has 
remained almost inaccessible to the experiment until now, as the genetic method has been applied 
towards it. Here then, development is shown as the key to the understanding of one of the most 
complicated inner functions of human consciousness. Hence, the finding of the adequate research 
method of inner speech has indeed moved the entire problem from a dead point. Therefore, we 
first stop to analyze the method.  
Apparently Piaget was the first to pay attention to the basic function of a child’s 
egocentric speech, and he was able to evaluate it in terms of its theoretical significance. His 
contribution lies in the fact that he did not pass by this routinely repeated fact that is familiar to 
each individual who has seen the child. Instead, he attempted to study the fact theoretically. 
However, he also remained completely blind to the most important characteristics of egocentric 
speech, that is, precisely to its genetic origins and its connection with inner speech. On this 
account, he falsely interpreted its own nature with functional, structural, and genetic aspects. 
Starting off from Piaget, we moved to the center of our research, precisely onto the problem of 
the relationship of egocentric speech with inner speech. We believe that for the first time, this 
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leads us to the possibility of studying the nature of inner speech experimentally with an 
unprecedented completeness. 
Previously, we had already outlined all the basic considerations, compelling us to 
conclude that egocentric speech presents itself as a series of stages that precede the development 
of inner speech.  As we remember, these considerations were of three classifications: functional 
(we found that egocentric speech performs the intellectual functions as inner speech does), 
structural (we found that egocentric speech is similar to inner speech in terms of its structure), 
and innate (we compared Piaget’s established fact of the atrophying of egocentric speech to the 
moment of the occurrence of schooling age with a series of factors that forces an attribution to the 
beginning of the development of inner speech, and from here we conclude that on the threshold of 
schooling age, the atrophying of egocentric speech does not occur, but its transition and regrowth 
into inner speech does.) This new working hypothesis on the structure, function and fate of 
egocentric speech gave us the possibility to not only restructure the whole study of egocentric 
speech in a radical form, but also allows us to penetrate the question regarding the nature of inner 
speech in depth. If our presumption that egocentric speech presents itself as the earlier forms of 
inner speech is trustworthy, then the question regarding the method of the research of inner 
speech is therefore answered. […] From this understanding of the nature of egocentric speech, 
Piaget’s view follows onto the structure, function and fate of this form of speech. In egocentric 
speech, the child must not adapt to the thought of the adult; hence his thought stays egocentric to 
a maximum level, that it finds its own expression in the incomprehensibility of egocentric speech 
for the other in its brevity, and for its other structural features. In terms of function, in this case, 
egocentric speech may not be anything but a simple accompaniment, accompanying the basic 
melody of child activity and with no changes in this very melody. This is rather an accompanying 
phenomenon than a phenomenon that has a independent functional meaning. This speech does not 
carry out any function in the child’s behavior and thinking. In the end, as long as it appears to be 
the expression of the child’s egocentrism, the latter doom into extinction in the course of child 
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development, it is natural that its genetic fate is also a deletion that is parallel to the deletion of 
egocentrism in the thought of the child. Hence, the development of egocentric speech moves 
along a falling curve, a vertex that is located in the beginning of the development which falls to 
null on the verge of the schooling age. Hence, we can talk about egocentric speech with the words 
of Liszt regarding the wunderkinds (child prodigy) that all its future is in the past. Egocentric 
speech does not have a future. It does not arise; nor does it develop together with the child. 
Instead, it withers and fades away, presenting itself as rather involutionary by nature, rather than 
an evolutionary process. If, in this sense, the development of egocentric speech occurs along an 
incessantly fading curve, then it is natural that at any given stage of child development this 
speech arises from the insufficiency of the socialization of child’s speech that is initially 
individualistic, and appears as a direct expression of the stage of this insufficiency, and 
incompleteness of socialization. In accordance with the opposing theory, the child’s egocentric 
speech presents itself as one of the phenomena of the transition from the inter-mental function to 
the intra-mental one, that is, from the social form, the child’s collective activity, to his individual 
functions.  
As we have shown in one of our earlier works, this transition appears to be the general 
law for the development of all the higher mental functions that initially emerge as the forms or 
activities in the collaboration. Only then, the child is transferred into the sphere of his own mental 
forms of activity. The speech for oneself initially arises along the path of the differentiation of the 
social function of speech for others. The main track of child development appears to be not the 
gradual socialization that is brought into the child from outside, but the gradual individualization, 
emerging on the basis of the child’s internal socialization. Thus, following this perspective, our 
views on the question regarding the structure, function and fate of egocentric speech change. It 
seems to us that its (egocentric speech’s) structure develops parallel to the isolation of its function 
and in correspondence to its functions. In other words, acquiring a new purpose, speech is 
naturally reconstructed in its structure in accordance to the new functions. We stop in detail 
	   	  38	  	  
below on these structural features. We simply say that these features do not fade away, nor do 
they smoothen out. They do not decrease to nothing but they strengthen and grow. They evolve 
and develop together with the age of the child so that their development, as all of egocentric 
speech’s, then, occurs not along the falling curve but along the rising curve. […] 
 Inner speech is the muted and silent speech. This is its basic distinction. However, 
precisely in this direction, in the sense of the graduation growth of this distinction the evolution 
of egocentric speech occurs. Its vocalization fails to null and it becomes a muted speech. 
However, this has to necessarily be the case if it presents itself as the earlier genetic stages in the 
development of inner speech. The fact that this feature gradually emerges, that egocentric speech 
isolates in the functional and structural relationship earlier than it does in the relationship of 
vocalization indicates that which we have laid our basis on in our hypothesis on the development 
of inner speech- precisely that inner speech does not grow along the path of the external 
weakening of its vocal aspect, transitioning from a speech to a whisper and from a whisper to a 
silent speech. Instead, it grows along the path of the functional and structural weakening from 
outer speech, the transition from it to the egocentric speech and from egocentric speech to inner 
speech. In this sense, the contradiction between the fading away of the outer manifestation of 
egocentric speech and the growth of its inner features turn out to be an apparent contradiction. In 
fact, behind the falling of the coefficient of egocentric speech hides the positive development of 
one if the central features of inner speech—the abstraction from the voiced aspect of speech, and 
the final differentiation of inner speech and outer speech. Hence, all three of these basic groups of 
features (functional, structural and genetic) are known facts to us, from the form of the 
development of egocentric speech (including Piaget’s facts) according to the saying regarding the 
one and very matter: the egocentric speech develops in the direction towards inner speech, and 
the entire course of its development cannot be understood otherwise- as the course of the gradual 
progressive growth of all the main distinctive properties of inner speech. […] This is the kind of 
question that was standing before our experiment. To set off with the points for its construction, 
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we have chosen the moments that are noted by Piaget himself in egocentric speech, and 
consequently, not presenting any kind of doubt in the sense of their factual implements towards 
the circle of the phenomena that we have studied. Even though Piaget does not give these 
incidents any kind of theoretical connotation, rather describing them as the outer features of 
egocentric speech, these three features of egocentric speech impressed us from the very 
beginning: 
1) It presents itself as a collective monologue, that is, it appears to be none other than how it does 
in the child’s collective with the existence of other children, occupied by this very activity and 
not when the child is left alone on his own. 
2) Where this collective monologue is accompanied by the illusion of understanding (as 
Piaget noted); where the child believes and assumes that those around him understand the 
egocentric expressions that he addresses to no one. 
3) In the end, the fact that this speech for oneself posses the character of outer speech, completely 
resembling the socialized speech, and he (the child) does not vaguely annunciate to himself in a 
whisper to himself.  
All three of these existing features cannot be a coincidence. From the child’s point of 
view, egocentric speech is not even subjectively separated from social speech (the illusion of 
understanding), and not objective in terms of a situation (collective monologue) and a form 
(vocalization). It is not separated and isolated form social speech. This itself already did not 
incline our view into the direction of the study regarding the insufficient socialization as the 
origin of egocentric speech. These features of speech are rather considered in the favor of the 
excessive socialization and the insufficient isolation of the speech for oneself from the speech of 
others. After all, they say that egocentric speech, the speech for oneself, flows in the objective 
and subjective conditions that are inherent of the social speech for others. The fact that our 
evaluation of these three features does not appear to be the consequence of the previous thought, 
it is apparent from the similar evaluation without any experimentation, and only on the basis of 
	   	  40	  	  
the interpretation of the very data of Piaget himself, who approaches Grünbaum, with whom we 
cannot disagree in this case. He says that there is a case, in which the surficial observation forces 
us to think that the child is absorbed into himself. This false impression emerges from that which 
we expect from the three-year-old child’s logical relationship towards his surroundings. Since this 
kind of relationship towards the reality is not natural to the child, we may easily assume that he 
lives in the immersion of individual thought and fantasy, and that he is characterized by the 
egocentric setting. During the course of cooperative play, three to five year old children are often 
occupied with their individual selves, and often only speak to themselves. If from a distance this 
produces the impression of the conversation, then with a closer approach this turns out to be a 
collective monologue, parts of which are not subservient to the other, and neither do they answer 
one another. However, ultimately, it would seem that the clearest example of the child’s 
egocentric setting appears to be, in fact, the proof of the social connectivity of the child’s mind. 
The deliberate isolation from the collective or the autism, in the sense of contemporary 
psychiatry, does not take place in the collective monologue. In fact, they appear to be directly 
opposite to this. Piaget, who strongly emphasizes the child’s egocentrism and takes it as the 
cornerstone of his whole theory of the child’s mental characteristics, has yet to recognize that 
during the collective monologue, children believe that they are talking to each other and that they 
listen to each other. It is true that they behave themselves as though they do not pay attention to 
others, but only because they believe that each of their thought that is not altogether or 
insufficiently expressed is nevertheless an overall property. In Grünbaum’s view, this appears to 
be a proof of the insufficient isolation of a child’s individual mind from the social whole.   
 In the first series of experiments we attempted to destroy the illusion that arises with the 
egocentric speech of the child in terms of his understanding towards other children. To do this we 
placed the child, the coefficient of egocentric speech, of which was previously changed, in the 
situation that is completely similar to Piaget’s experiments. Piaget, on the other hand: either 
organized his (the child’s) activity in a collective of non-speaking and deaf children, or placed the 
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child in a collective of children who spoke a language other than his. As for the remaining 
conditions, the situation is left unchanged in terms of its structure, as well as all the details. The 
variable in our experiment appears to be only the illusion of understanding, naturally emerging in 
the first situation, and it is excluded beforehand in the second situation. How did egocentric 
speech act with the exclusion of the illusion of understanding? Experiments demonstrated that its 
coefficient in the critical experiment without the illusion of understanding rapidly fell, while 
majority of the cases reached zero, whilst in the other remaining situations it was reduced eight 
times on average. 
In the second series of experiments, we introduced the collective monologue of the child 
as the variable upon the transition from the basic to the critical experiment. Once again the 
coefficient of egocentric speech initially changed in the basic situation, in which this phenomenon 
emerged in the form of a collective monologue. Then, the child’s activity is transferred into a 
different situation, where the possibility of the collective monologue is excluded or after which 
the child is placed in the midst of unfamiliar children, with whom he had not converse neither 
before, after nor during the course of the experiment. Either this, or that whereby the child s 
placed in isolation from the children by another table in the corner of the room, or in the case 
where he worked completely alone, outside of the collective, or in the end, where the experiment 
left midway through the experiment, leaving the child alone though preserving himself the 
possibility to see and listen to the child. The general results of these experiments completely 
agree with those that were lead to us in the first series of experiments. […] 
In the end, in the third series of our experiments, we chose the vocalization of the egocentric 
speech to be our variable with the transition from the basic to the critical experiments. After the 
change of the coefficient of egocentric speech in the basic situation, the child transferred into 
another situation in which the possibility of vocalization was difficult or excluded. The child 
seated himself distantly from others, and he also seated himself with big gaps in another hall, or 
behind the wall of the laboratory in which the experiment was carried out, where the orchestra 
	   	  42	  	  
produced such a voice that it completely drowned not only the voice of others, but his own voice; 
and in the end, the child was specifically instructed to speak loudly and he was asked to carry out 
a conversation none other than with a soft and soundless whisper. In all of these critical 
experiments we once again observed that which was observed in the first two cases with 
remarkable regularity: the rapid fall of the curve of the coefficient of egocentric speech 
downward. It is true, that in these experiments the reduction of coefficient was expression a little 
more complicatedly than it was in the second experiment. […]  
 In all of the three series we pursued the one and very goal: we took into basis the research 
of these three phenomena that arise with almost every egocentric speech of the child: the illusion 
of understanding, collective monologue, and vocalization. These three phenomena appear to be 
general to egocentric speech and social speech. We experimentally compared the situations of the 
presence and absence of these phenomena and observed that the exclusion of these features that 
bring the speech for oneself together with the speech for others, inevitably leads to the fading of 
egocentric speech. From here we are right to conclude that the child’s egocentric speech is 
already differentiated in the functional and structural relationship, as a special speech form that 
still has not been ultimately separated from social speech, from where it developed and matured 
all the time. […] 
The study of the psychological nature of inner speech with the aid of this method, which 
we attempted to experimentally generalized, lead us to the conviction that the inner speech should 
be considered not as speech minus sound, but as a speech function that is unique in its structure 
and function that it is organized completely differently than outer speech, which is located in this 
latest inseparable and dynamic unit of transitions from one plane to the other. The first and main 
feature of inner speech appears to be its completely unique syntax. Studying the syntax of inner 
speech in the child’s egocentric speech, we noticed one essential feature that discovers the certain 
dynamic tendency of the growth with the extent of egocentric speech. This feature is manifested 
in the apparent fragmentation and abbreviation of inner speech in relation to outer speech. […] 
	   	  43	  	  
A completely analogical phenomenon is observed in the child’s egocentric speech with 
the only difference that it advances before us, transitioning from age to age in this manner to the 
extent that the approximation of the egocentric speech reaches its maximum towards inner speech 
on the threshold of the school age. The study of the dynamics of its growth does not leave any 
kind of doubt on the fact that, if this curve were to continue further, it must, in its limits, lead us 
to the reduction of the incomprehensibility, abbreviation, and the reduction of inner speech. 
However, the whole benefit of the study of egocentric speech, is, in this case, what we are able to 
tract step by step, how these features of inner speech grow from the first stage to the last. As 
Piaget noted, egocentric speech also turns out to be incomprehensible if we do not know the 
situation in which it grows. It could also turn out to be abbreviated and reduced in relation to 
outer speech. […] 
In order to clarify this primary feature, it is necessary to compare it to the analogical 
picture that arises in the specific situations in outer speech. The clear predicativity arises in outer 
speech in two basic situations, as our observations demonstrate: either in the situation of the 
answer or in the situation where the subject of discussion is known to both interlocutors. Towards 
the question on whether you want a cup of tea, no one will answer in the expanded phrase: “ No, I 
do not want a cup of tea.” The answer will be a clear predicate “No.” It will be inclusive of only 
one predicate. It is obvious that this kind of predicative sentence is only possibly because of its 
subject which was discussed in the sentence and implied by the interlocutors. This also precisely 
applies to the question “Has your brother read the book?”, as it is never preceded by the answer 
“Yes, my brother read this book”. Instead it is clearly preceded by the predicative answer “Yes” 
or “He read.” 
 A completely analogical proposal is created in the second case- in the situation where the 
subject predicate is known to the interlocutors in advance. We imagine that a few people are 
waiting by the tram stop for the tram “B,” in order to travel in a certain respective direction. 
Never once had any of these people, having noticed the tram, says in the full phrase “The B 
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Tram, which we await, in order to get to somewhere, is coming”, though the statement will 
always be reduced to one predicate “It is coming” or “B.” Obviously, in this case, the clear 
predicative sentence emerged in the live speech only because the subject and the word that 
designates it is directly known from the situation in which the interlocutors were in. Often the 
corresponding predicative judgments give rise to the comical misunderstandings and different 
kinds of quid pro quo, due to the fact that the listener relates the predicate statement not to the 
subject that was in the mind of the speaker but to another subject that is contained in his thought. 
In both cases the pure predicativity arises when the subject predicate is contained in the thoughts 
of the interlocutors. If their thoughts correspond and they both have the same thing in mind, then 
the understanding is fully carried out with the help of the one and only predicate. If this predicate 
is referred to different subjects in their minds, an inevitable misunderstanding emerges. […] 
We find many clear examples of these kinds of reductions of outer speech and its 
information to a single predicate in the novels of Tolstoy, who has repeatedly returned to the 
psychology of understanding. “ No one heard what he (The dying Nikolai Levin. – 
L.V.) said, only Kity understood.” She understood because she constantly followed the thought of 
what he needs. We may say that, in her thoughts, having followed the thought of the dying person 
was the subject towards which the word that no one had understood was related. But perhaps the 
most notable example appears to be the explanation of Kitty and Levin through the beginning 
letters of words. 
“ I have been longing to ask you for one thing.” 
“Please, ask.” 
“Now,”- he said and wrote the beginning letters: W,Y A, M: T, I, N, P, D , I, M, A, T, 
O, N ?” 
These words mean “ When you answered me: This is not possible. 
“Did it mean anything then or ever? ” 
There was not any kind of probability that she may understand this complicated phrase. 
	   	  45	  	  
“ I understood”. She said, having blushed. 
“What is this word?” – He said, referring to “N”, which meant the word “never.” 
“This word means “never,” - she said – but this is not true.” 
He quickly wiped off the writing, fell, gave her the chalk and got up. 
She wrote “T, I, C, N, H, U, O.” He suddenly beamed, and understood. 
This meant, “Then I could not have understood otherwise.” 
She wrote the beginning letters “S, T, Y, C, F, A, F, W, H.” 
This meant, “ So that you could forget and forgive what happened.” 
He seized the chalk with intense trembling fingers and having broken it, he wrote the next 
beginning letters “I have to forget and forgive. I did not stop loving you.” 
“I understood,” she said in a whisper. 
He sat down and wrote another phrase. She understood everything, not asking him. She 
took the chalk and answered at that very instant. For a long time he could understand what she 
wrote, and often glanced into her eyes. He noted happiness. He could not howsoever fill in the 
words that she had in mind but in her charming and shining eyes that are filled with happiness, 
she understood all that he needed to know. He then wrote three letters. Though he had not 
finished writing, she already read beyond his hand and finished and wrote the answer herself: 
“Yes.” Everything was mentioned in their conversation; it was mentioned that she loves him and 
that she tells her father and mother that tomorrow he will come in the morning”(Anna Karenina, 
Part 4, Chapter 13). 
This example has a completely exclusive psychological connotation because the whole episode of 
the love confession between Levin and Kitty is borrowed by Tolstoy from his own biography. It 
was precisely in this manner where he himself confessed his love to C.A. Bers, his future wife. 
This example, like the previous one, has the closest relationship towards the phenomenon that 
interests us, the phenomenon that is central to the whole of inner speech: the problem of its 
abbreviation. With the same thoughts of the interlocutors, the role of verbal stimulation decreases 
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to the minimum with the same direction. However, between these, the understanding occurs 
unmistakably. Tolstoy turns our attention to the different work, onto the fact that between humans 
who live in a very grand psychological contact, the understanding with the aid of only 
abbreviated speech, with half words appears to be a rule, rather than an exclusion. “ Levin is 
already now used to bravely speaking his own mind, not giving himself the difficulty to invest in 
exact words: He knew, that his wife, as of these very intimate moments, will understand what he 
wants to say with a hint, and she understood him.” […]  
The deaf called the deaf to court before the deaf judge. The deaf shouted, “My cow is 
stolen by him!” 4 “Have mercy” The deaf cried to him and answered: “This wasteland is still 
owned by my late grandfather.” The judge decided, “For what do both of you brothers go against 
each other. Neither one of you is guilty, but the girl is to blame.” 
If we compare these two extreme situations- the explanation of Kitty and Levin, and the 
trial of the deaf people, we will find two poles, between which the phenomenon of the 
abbreviation of outer speech interchanges. This is what interests us. In the situation of the 
presence of the general subject in the thoughts of the interlocutors, the understanding is fully 
carried out with the aid of the maximally abbreviated speech from the edge with the simplified 
syntax; in the opposing case the understanding is completely not achieved even through expanded 
speech. Hence, sometimes it is unable to come to terms between not only these three deaf people, 
but also simply between any two people who are investing a different connotation in the one and 
very word or those who are standing on opposing perspectives. As Tolstoy said, all people who 
think independently and privately are taut towards the understanding of the thought of others, and 
they are particularly biased towards their own. On the contrary, the understanding in half-words, 
which Tolstoy sees as laconic and clear, is possible for people who are in contact. They can 
communicate the most complex thoughts almost without any words. […] 	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Recently, in linguistics the problem of the functional diversity of speech has appeared as 
one of the main problems. Even from the perspective of a linguist, language turns out to not be a 
united form of speech activity, but a summation of diverse speech functions. The view of 
language from a functional point of view, from the view of the condition and the whole speech 
utterance, was in the center of attention of the researchers. Humboldt already clearly recognized 
the functional diversity of speech in the context of the language of poetry and prose, which can 
never properly merge in their own direction and differences of each other because the poem is 
inseparable from music while the prose is presented exclusively to language. In Humboldt’s view, 
prose here is differed by the fact that language is used in the speech by their own advantages but 
by rightfully subordinating them to the dominating goal in this case; through the submission and 
combination of sentences in the prose, there develops a logical eurhythmy of thought in a very 
distinct way, in which the prosaic speech is adjusted by its own purpose. In both speech forms, 
language has its own features in the selection of an expression in the usage of grammatical forms 
and syntactic methods of the merging of words in speech. […] 
The dialogue always assumes the interlocutors’ knowledge of the core of the matter, 
which, as we observed, allows the whole series of abbreviation in oral speech and creates a clear 
predicative statement in certain situations. The dialogue always presupposes the visual perception 
of the interlocutor, his mimics and gestures and acoustic perception of the whole aspect of speech 
intonation. Together, these facts allow the understanding through half-words (hints) and the 
communication with the aid of signs, the examples of which we lead to earlier. Only in oral 
speech do we find the kind of conversation where (as stated by Tarde) speech appears to be only a 
supplement to the interchanging glances between the interlocutors. Since we already discussed 
the tendency of oral speech towards the abbreviation earlier, we will point out the acoustic aspect 
of speech and take the classical example of Dostoevsky’s writing, which demonstrates the extent 
that the intonation facilitates the subtle differentiations in the understanding of word meaning. 
Dostoevsky narrates about the language of the drunks that consists quite simply of one of a single 
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non-lexical noun. 
“Once upon a time on a Sunday, when the evening arrived, we happened to talk alongside 
a crowd of six drunken workers from fifteen steps. I was suddenly convinced that all thoughts, 
sensations and even a whole chain of deep reasoning could be expressed to the extreme of this 
very single short noun. So one man very sharply and energetically pronounces this noun, in order 
to express something that occurred as a common speech among them earlier, his very most 
contemptuous rejection. The other answered him with the very same noun, but already in a 
completely different tone and sense,- precisely in the sense of the full doubt in the validity of the 
rejection of the first man. The third man suddenly comes into resentment against the first man, 
sharply and recklessly cuts into the conversation and shouted the very same noun to him, but in 
an abusive and opprobrious sense. Then the second cuts into the conversation in resentment 
towards the third man, to the offender, once again and stops him in this sense: “ What did you 
say? Why did you fly in like this, fellow? We were peacefully discussing and from where did you 
come in climbing the mountain of swears?” 
So then all this thought was spoken with these very words, with one reserved word, by 
the same extremely monosyllabic name of an object, except that he only raised the hand and took 
the third man by the shoulder. However, suddenly the fourth man appeared, the youngest of all 
men, who was silent until now, should suddenly searching around for the solution of the difficulty 
that had initially given rise to the argument. In delight, raising his hand he shouts “Eureka” You 
think that he has found it? Has he? No, it is no “Eureka” at all, and he has not found it; he only 
repeats the very same non-lexical noun, the one and only word, just one word, but only with 
delight, with the shriek of ecstasy and it seems to be too strong because this was disliked by the 
sixth, most sullen and oldest man. In a flash he upsets the naïve delight of the young man, 
addressing him and repeating with sullen and instructive bass. “Yes, all this is the same, the noun 
that is forbidden in front of the ladies, which however, clearly and exactly meant “what are you 
yelling about? Fighting your voice” And so, not blurting another single word, they repeated the 
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one and only favorite word of theirs six times in a row, one after another and understood each 
other completely. This is a fact that I have witnessed. […] 
It is completely understood that written speech in this case, is the opposing pole of oral 
speech. In written speech the situation that is clear to both interlocutors and all the possibility of 
the expressions of intonations, mimics, and gests are absent beforehand. Consequently, here, the 
possibility of all abbreviations, of which we talked about in relation towards oral speech, is 
excluded in advance. Here the understanding occurs on the account of the words and their 
combination. Written speech promotes the flow of speech in the order of a complex activity. 
Here, verbal activity is defined as complex. This underlines the use of rough drafts. The path 
from a “rough draft” to a “clear copy” is the path of a complex activity. However, even with the 
absence of a factual draft, the moment of reflection in written speech is very strong; we very often 
talk to ourselves first, then we write; here there is a thoughtful draft. This thoughtful draft of 
written speech is indeed, as we attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapter, inner speech. 
This speech plays the role of an inner draft in oral speech as well as in written speech. We must 
therefore compare the tendency for abbreviation in inner speech with that of oral speech and 
written speech. […] 
We will begin from this second direction: the comparison of inner speech to oral and 
written speech especially because this path has already been followed through by us until the very 
end and that it has already been outlined by us all for the final clarification of thought. The whole 
matter is included in the fact that these very circumstances that sometimes create the possibility 
of pure predicative judgments, and that are completely absent in written speech, appear to be 
consistent and unchanging companions of inner speech, inseparable from it. Hence, the very 
tendency towards the predicativity must inevitably emerge, and as the experiment shows, it 
inevitably arises in inner speech as a constant phenomenon, and moreover, in its very pure and 
absolute form. Hence, if written speech appears to be the opposite pole of oral speech in the sense 
of the maximal expansion and complete absence of the conditions that cause the absence of the 
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predicate in oral speech, inner speech then appears to be the opposite pole of oral speech, but in 
the reverse connotation since the absolute and consistent predicativity dominates within it. Oral 
speech, in this sense, occupies the mediating place between written speech on the one hand, and 
inner speech on the other. We have a closer look at these conditions that contribute towards the 
abbreviation of inner speech. […] We always know what the dialogue in our inner speech is 
about. We are always in the course of our inner situation. The theme of our inner dialogue is 
always known to us. We know what we are thinking about. The subject of our inner judgment is 
always there in our thoughts. It is always implied. Piaget somehow notes that we easily believe in 
the word ourselves, and hence the demand in the proofs and ability to justify our own thought 
emerges only in the process of collision of our thoughts with foreign thoughts. By this very law 
we may say that we easily understand ourselves through half-words, with hints. In the speech that 
flows with itself, we are always in a situation that emerges in the oral dialogue and the examples 
towards which we led earlier. From time to time, this occurs more like an exception than a rule. If 
we return to these examples, it may be said that inner speech always, precisely as a rule, flow in 
such a situation when the speaker utters the whole judgment on the tram stop with one short 
predicate “B”. Indeed we are always in our expectation and intentions in the course. We ourselves 
never have the need to resort towards the expanded formulas: 
“The B tram, which we await in order to get to somewhere, is coming”. Here, only the one 
predicate always turns out to be necessary and sufficient. The subject always remains in the mind, 
similarly to how the remainders over ten remain in a student’s mind when he is doing addition. 
[…] 
Our analysis leads us to another conclusion: secondly, it demonstrates that the functional 
change of speech necessarily leads to the change of its very structure. Once again, that which is 
noted in inner speech is only the more or less the weakly expressed tendency towards the 
structural changes under the influence of the functional features of speech, which is observed and 
brought to its limits in inner speech in the absolute form. The function of inner speech, as we may 
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establish it in the genetic and experimental research, steadily and systematically leads towards 
that whereby egocentric speech, initially differing from social speech only a functional sense, 
gradually, in the extent of the growth of this functional differentiation, is changed in its very own 
structure, reaching up to its limit to the full abolition of the syntax of oral speech. If we return to 
the direct research on the structural features of inner speech from this comparison of inner speech 
to oral speech, we may trace, step by step, the growth of the predicativity. In the very beginning, 
egocentric speech is still completely merged with social speech structurally. […] 
Towards the moment of its extinction and transmitting into inner speech it already 
reproduces the impression of fragmentary speech since it is already almost subordinated to a clear 
predicative syntax. The observations during the experiments demonstrate when, through which 
manner, and from which source this new syntax of inner speech arises. The child speaks about 
that which is happening in front of him. Hence, he releases, reduces, and condenses the subject 
and the designating word more and more. More and more the child reduces his own speech up till 
the one predicate. The significant pattern which we were able to establish in the result of these 
experiments consists in the following: the more egocentric speech is expressed as such in its own 
functional connotation, the more clearly the features of its syntax appear in the sense of its 
simplification and predicativity. If to compare the child’s egocentric speech in our experiments in 
these situations whereby it performed in a specific role of inner speech as a means of 
understanding upon the interferences and difficulties that are experimentally caused, with these 
situations and when it appeared within this function is the case, we may undoubtedly establish 
that the stronger the specific, intellectual function of inner speech is expressed as such, the more 
distinctly will the features of its syntactic structure be. However, this predicativity of inner speech 
still does not deplete itself of all these complex phenomena that find their total external 
expression in the abbreviation of inner speech relative to oral speech. When we attempt to 
analyze this complicated phenomena we find that the whole series of structural features of inner 
speech upon which we only focused on the main points–is hidden behind it. Primarily, here the 
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reduction of the phonetic features of speech, with which we have already encountered in many 
cases of the abbreviation of oral speech, should be addressed. The exchange between Kitty and 
Levin, the long conversation which was carried out through the initial letters of the words, and the 
guessing of the whole phrase, already allowed us to conclude that with the same directional 
awareness, the role of verbal interference decreases to the minimum (the beginning letters) while 
the understanding occurs unmistakably. However, this reduction towards the minimum of the role 
of verbal interference was similarly led to the limit, and it was observed almost in an absolute 
form in inner speech because the identical directionality of the existing consciousness reaches its 
fullness. In fact, in inner speech there always exists the situation that appears to be a rare and 
surprising exclusion in oral speech. In inner speech we are always located in the situation of Kitty 
and Levin’s conversation. Hence, in inner speech we always play the secretary, as the old prince 
names this conversation, all which is built on the guessing of the complicated phrases through the 
beginning letters. We find this analogy regarding the conversation in the Lemetre’s researches of 
inner speech surprising. One of Lemetre’s studies was about twelve year olds’ thought on the 
phrase “Les montagnes de la Suisse sont belles” in the orders of the letters: L, m, n, d, l, S, s, b, 
behind which stands the looming line of the mountain (41. Pg5). In the very beginning of the 
formation of inner speech, we find that the manner of the abbreviation of speech is completely 
illogical: the reduction of the phonetic aspect of the word to the beginning letters, as it took place 
in the conversation of Kitty and Levin. In inner speech we never have the necessity to pronounce 
the words fully. We already understand by the intention itself, the kind of words we have to 
pronounce. With the comparison of these two examples, we do not want to say that in inner 
speech words are always occupied with the beginning letters and that this speech is expanded 
with the aid of the kind of mechanism, which turned out to be identical in both situations. We 
have in mind something more general. We only want to say that which is similar in oral speech: 
the role of verbal interference is reduced to the minimum in oral speech where there is a shared 
orientation of consciousness, as it took place in the Kitty and Levin’s conversation; similarly to 
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the case whereby in inner speech the reduction of the phonetic aspect of speech takes place 
always consistently as a general rule. Inner speech, in this exact sense, is a speech almost without 
words. Precisely due to this, the correspondence of our examples seems significant to us; where 
in the known rare cases in both oral and inner speech, the words are reduced to the beginning 
letters, in both cases it turns out to be completely possible for the identical mechanism to 
convince us even more in the inner relativity of the phenomenon of oral speech and inner speech 
that is being compared. […] 
We clarify this difference between the meaning and the sense of the word in the example 
of Krylov’s fable “ The dragonfly and the Ant”. The word “float,” with which this fable ends, has 
a completely definite and consistent meaning, identical for any given context, in which it is 
encountered. However, in the context of the fable, it acquires a much wider intellectual and 
effective thought. […] A word acquires, absorbs from the whole context, into which it is 
interwoven, intellectual and affective continent and it will start to mean either more or less than 
the meaning that it consists of when we consider it separately and outside of the context: more-
because its circle of meaning expands, acquiring yet a whole series of zones that are filled with 
new content; less-because the abstract meaning of the word is limited and narrowed by that which 
the word signifies in the present context. The sense of the word, Paulhan says, is a complicated, 
malleable, gradually changing to a certain extent with separate consciousness and for that one and 
very consciousness in response to the circumstances. In this relation the sense of a word is 
inexhaustible. The word acquires its own sense only in the phrase, but the very phrase acquires 
the sense only in the context of the paragraph; the paragraph in the context of the book; the book-
in the text of the whole creation of the author. The real sense of each word is ultimately defined 
with all the richness of the existing features in consciousness, attributed towards that (meaning) 
which is expressed through the present word. Paulhan says “The sense of the earth–it is the sun 
system which complements the representation of the earth; the sense of the solar system-it is the 
Milky Way, while the sense of the Milky Way- it means that we will never know the full sense of 
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something and consequently, the full sense of any kind of word. The word is the inexhaustible 
source of new problems. The sense of a word never appears to be full. Ultimately, it rests in the 
understanding of the word and in the inner structure of the personality as a whole.” […] 
In fact, the infusion of the diverse semantic content into a single word presents itself as a 
form of an individual, untranslatable meaning every time, (i.e. idioms). That which was 
introduced in the classic example of Dostoevsky that we have shown occurs here. That which 
occurred in the conversation of the six drunken workmen, and that appears to be excluded from 
outer speech, appears to be a rule for inner speech. In inner speech we can always express all the 
thoughts, feelings, as well as whole deep reasoning, with only one title. And of course, in the case 
of the meaning of this single title for the complex thoughts, the feelings and reasoning would be 
untranslatable onto the language of outer speech; they would be incomparable with the normal 
meaning of this very word. Due to this idiomatic character or all of the semantics of inner speech, 
it naturally turns out to be incomprehensible and hardly translatable into our ordinary language.  
On this we may conclude the overview of the features of inner speech, which we 
observed in our experiments. We can only say that we may initially ascertain all these features 
through the experimental research of egocentric speech, but for the interpretation of these facts 
we resort to their comparison with the analogous and kindred facts in the form of inner speech. 
Not only was this important to us not only as the path of the generalization of the factors that we 
found but consequently, the correct interpretation, not only as the means to clarify the complex 
and subtle features of inner speech through the examples of oral speech, but mainly because the 
comparison demonstrated that the possibility of the formation of these features are already 
included in outer speech. It thereby confirmed our hypothesis on the genesis of inner speech from 
egocentric speech and outer speech. It is important that all these features may arise along the 
familiar conditions in outer speech; it is important that it is generally possible that the tendency 
towards the predicativity; towards the reduction of the phasic aspect of speech, the predominance 
of the sense over word meaning, the agglutination of the semantic units as well as the influence of 
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sense and the idiomaticity of speech may be observed in inner speech. Consequently, the nature 
and laws of the word allow this and make this possible. This, we repeat, appears in our view as 
the best confirmation of our hypothesis regarding the origin of inner speech through the path of 
the differentiation of the child’s egocentric speech and social speech. […] 
This new plane of verbal thinking is the thought itself. The first task of our analysis 
appears to be the isolation of this plane; dismembering it from this very unit in which it is always 
encountered. We already discussed that any given thought seeks to unite something with 
something else. It has a movement, a part, a deployment, that establishes a relationship between 
two things with one word that fulfills a kind of function, a work, and it solves a kind of task. This 
course and movement of thought do not directly and straightforwardly correspond to the 
expanded speech. The units of thought and the units of speech do not correspond. These 
processes reveal a unit, but not an identity. They are related to each other through complex 
transitions and transformations, but they do not cover each other as they overlap one another on a 
straight line. It is simplest of all to ensure this in the cases where the task of the thought does end 
successfully; when it turns out that the thought did not go into the word, as Dostoevsky says. We 
once again use the literary examples for clarification, the scene of observation of one of Gleb 
Uspenky’s character. The scene, where the unhappy pedestrian, not finding words for the 
expression of a firing thought, owning them, is helplessly tormented and wanders in silence in 
order for god to provide an understanding, and this leaves his inexpressibly painful sensation. Yet 
essentially that which this poor dejected mind is experiencing is no different than the torments of 
the words in the poet or the thinker. Almost with these very words he said, “I would have said to 
you, my friend…” From time to time darkness is replaced with the fleeting intervals of light; 
thought is clarified to the unhappy man, and to him, as to the poet, it seems that “ the mystery will 
accept a familiar face.” He proceeds to explain“ If I, for example, go to the ground, because I am 
from the ground. If I go to the ground, for example, vice versa, how is it possible for the –” 
“Ah..ah!” we joyfully uttered. 
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“Wait, there has to be one word still…Do you see, gentleman, how necessary that is…” 
The pedestrian got up and stood in the center of the room, preparing to put another finger aside on 
his hand, “Here the most present fact is not mentioned at all. And here is how it should be: why, 
for example…”but here he stopped and lively uttered, who gave you a soul?” 
“God.” 
“Right. Good. Now, look here…” 
We were prepared to glance, but the pedestrian once again stammered, having lost the energy, 
and, having punched his hips with his hands, almost exclaimed desperately “No! You will do 
nothing! Not everything is there..Ah, my god! There is only so much I can tell you! Here we must 
speak from the won! Here about the soul, it is necessary, even just a little! Not even! Not even!” 
In this case the aspect that is separating thought from word is clearly visible; it is 
intransitive for the speaker’s lexicon that separates thinking from speech. If thought were to 
directly correspond in its structure and period, with the structure and flow of speech, this case, 
which is described by Uspensky, it were to be impossible. Yet in reality,  thought has its own 
distinct structure and flow, a transition from which, towards the  structure and flow of speech, 
presents great difficulties not only to the very one character mentioned in the earlier scene. 
Perhaps the stage artists encountered this problem on the thought that is hiding behind the word, 
earlier than the psychologists. Often in Stanislavsky’s system we find such an attempt to recreate 
a subtext of each replica in a drama; that is to uncover the thought and desire that are standing 
behind each statement. Once again we return to the example. 
Chatskiiy says to Sophia “ Blessed is the one who believes, it keeps him warm on earth.”  
Stanislavsky discloses the subtext of this phrase as the thought “ We will cease this 
conversation.” 
Thus we move to the conclusion that thought does not correspond directly to verbal 
expression. Thought does not consist of separate words like speech does. If I want to convey the 
thought that today I saw a boy in a blue blouse who ran along the street on foot, I do not 
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separately see the boy, the blouse and that the blouse is blue, and that he was without shoes, that 
he runs. I see everything together in one act of thought but I disarticulate this in the speech into 
separate words. Thought always presents itself as a certain whole, significantly more than a 
separate word in regard to its extent and volume. The speaker often develops the one and very 
thought in the course of a few moments. This thought is contained in his mind as a whole; it does 
not gradually arise with separate units, as its speech develops. That which is simultaneously 
contained in thought is successively expanded in speech. Thought may be compared to an 
overhanging cloud that pours a rain of words. Hence, the process of the transition from thought to 
speech presents itself as an extremely complex process of the dismembering of the thought and its 
recreation in words. Precisely due to the fact that thought does not only correspond with words, 
but also with the meanings of the words in which it is expressed, the path from thought to word 
passes through the meaning. In our speech there is always a guessed thought, a hidden subtext. 
Since the direct transition from thought to word is impossible, it always demands the paving of a 
complex path, arise the complaints on the imperfection of a word and the lamentation concerning 
the inexpressibility of thought arises. […] For the sake of overcoming of these complaints araises 
the attempt to fuse words, creating new paths from thought to word through the new meaning of 
words. Khlebnikov compared this work with the paving of a path from one valley into another; he 
talked about the direct path from Moscow to Kiev, not through New York, and he called himself 
a traveler of language. […] 
In the end, it is left for us to make the final, concluding step in our analysis of the inner 
planes of verbal thinking. Thought is still not the final instance in all of this process. 
Thought itself is not born from another thought, but from the motivational sphere of our 
consciousness, which encompasses our vision and demands, our interest and intentions, our 
affections and emotions. Behind a thought stands the effective and volitional tendency. It is the 
only one that may provide the answer to the last “why” in the analysis of thinking. If earlier we 
compared thought to an overhanging cloud that is pouring a rain of words, than we may compare 
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the motivation of thought to the wind that leads towards the movement of the cloud. A real and 
true understanding of an unfamiliar thought becomes possible only when we uncover its real 
effectively volitional background. This disclosure of motives leading to the emergence of thought 
and directing it with the flow, may be illustrated through the example that has already been used 
by us, regarding disclosure of the subtext at the stage of the interpretation of some sort of role. 
Behind each excerpt of the drama’s character stands a desire, as Stanislavsky teaches, that is 
directed toward the realization of a definite volitional task. That which needs to be recreated in 
this current situation through the method of a specific interpretation is the initial moment in any 
act of verbal thinking in living speech. Behind each statement stands the volitional task. Hence, 
parallel to the text of the play, Stanislavsky noted that the desire lies beneath the character’s 
thought and speech in each line of the play. We bring into example the text and subtext for 
several excerpts from the role of Chatsky in the interpretation of Stanislavsky. 
 
(Parallel to the foreshadowed desires) 
Text of the drama- replicas 
Sophia: 
Ah, Chatsky, I am so glad to see you. (Wants to hide confusion) 
Chatsky: 
You are glad, in a lucky day. However, who can sincerely rejoice that way? It seems to be, at 
least, people and horses are shivering, I only pleased my self. (Wants to appeal to her conscience 
through mockery. How could you not be ashamed!) 
Liza: 
Now, sir, if only you were behind the doors, by heaven, not five minutes ago, you would have 
remembered that we spoke of you! Madame, say it yourself! (Wants to trigger openness) 
Sophia: 
Always, not only now. You cannot reproach me so. (Wants to calm; Wants to help Sophia in the 
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hard sentence) 
Chatsky: 
You put it that way. Blesssed is the one who believes, it keeps him warm on earth.” (Wants to 
calm Chatsky. I am not guilty of anything! Cease this conversation! And so forth.) 
 
Upon the understanding of an unfamiliar speech, the understanding of certain words turns 
out to be insufficient, but not the thought of the interlocutors. However, the understanding of the 
interlocutors thought without the understanding of his motive (of that which is expressed by his 
thought) is an incomplete understanding. It is precisely the same in the psychological analysis of 
any given utterance. Only in the end we find out when we reveal this final and most secretive 
internal plane of verbal thinking: its motivation. Our analysis ends on this. We attempt to briefly 
look at the results towards which we were lead. Verbal thinking was presented to us as a complex 
dynamic whole, in which the relationship between thought and word was discovered to be the 
movement through a whole series of inner planes, as a transition from one plane to another. We 
carried our analysis from the inner most plane towards the outer most plane. In the live drama of 
verbal thinking the movement occurs in a reversed direction: from the motive furthering some 
kind of thought to the formation of the thought itself, to its mediating words in inner speech, 
followed by the meanings of outer speech, and lastly to the words. However, it would be incorrect 
for it to present itself as this only path from thought to word is always performed in practice. On 
the contrary, a wide variety of movements are possible, and they are barely countable with the 
present condition of our knowledge this process, the direct and reversed movement, and the direct 
and reversed transition from one plane to the other. However we already know now, in the most 
basic form, that the movement that breaks off an any given point of this complex path is possible 
in both directions: from the motive through thought to inner speech; from inner speech to 
thought; from inner speech to outer speech and so forth. In our task the study of all of these 
diverse, really ongoing movement on the foundation of the path from thought to word, was not 
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included. We were interested in only one matter, the basic and main: the disclosure of the 
relationship between thought and word as a dynamic process, as the path from thought to word, as 
the confirmation and absorption of thought in word. […] 
The theories that have attempted to solve this question have remained polarized around 
two opposing positions. One pole forms a clearly behavioristic understanding of thinking and 
speech, having found its own expression in the formula: thought is speech minus sound. Another 
pole presents the edgy idealistic study that is developed with the representations of Bergson and 
Wurzburg School regarding the full independence of thought from word, regarding the 
misstatement that brings word into thought. “ Uttered thought is a lie”- this poem of Tiutchev 
may serve the formula that expresses the very core of this study. […] 
We observed that the relationship of thought to word is the living process of the birth of 
thought in word. Word devoided of thought is foremost a dead word. As the poet says “And as 
the bees in the hive are deserted, the dead words foully smell.” However the thought, not 
absorbing in the word, remains a Stygian shadow, in the “mist, ring, and glow,” as another poet 
says. Hegel considered the word as a being that is vitalized by thought. This being is absolutely 
necessary for our thoughts. The connection of thought to word is not a primal connection that is 
given once and for all. It arises in the development and it itself develops. “In the beginning there 
was word.” Goethe responded to these evangelical words with the words of Faust “In the 
beginning there was the matter,” wishing so to devalue the word. However, Gutsman notes with 
Goethe that if to evaluate a word like this one, which is a sounding word, is too high–and to 
translate a biblical passage “ In the beginning there was the deed” with him, then it is even so 
possible to read it with another accent, if we briefly look at it from the perspective of the history 
of development: “In the beginning there was the matter.” Gutsman would like to say that the 
word presents itself as a higher level of human development in comparison to the highest 
expression of action. Ultimately he is right. The word was not in the beginning. In the beginning 
there was the deed. The word forms the end, rather than the beginning of the development. The 
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word is the end, which crowns the deed. In the inclusion of our research we must stop and say a 
few words on these perspectives that are revealed behind its threshold. Our research has brought 
us to the threshold of a problem that is broader, even more profound, and even more grand of a 
problem than the problem of thinking: the problem of consciousness. As mentioned before, our 
research always had in mind this side of the word, which remains a ground unknown to 
experimental psychology as the other side of the moon. We attempted to experimentally study the 
dialectic transition from the perspective aspect to the thinking aspect. We also attempted to 
demonstrate that the reality is reflected differently in thinking than it is in sensation, that the basic 
distinctive feature of the word appears to be the generalized reflection of its reality. So, we 
thereby touched on this aspect in the nature of the word, which significance exceeds the limits of 
thinking as such, and which, in its fullness, may be studied only in the context of a more general 
problem: a word and consciousness. If the drying and conceiving consciousness offers different 
methods of the reflecting reality, then they present themselves as the different types of 
consciousness. Hence, thinking and speech turn out to be the key towards the understanding of 
the nature of human consciousness. […] The actual research at each step demonstrates that a 
word plays a central role in the consciousness as a whole, but not in its separate functions. In 
Feurbach’s expression, the word, in consciousness, is that which is absolutely impossible for one 
person, but possible for two. It is the direct expression of the historical nature of human 
consciousness. 
Consciousness displays itself in a word, as the sun does in small drops of water. The 
word is related to consciousness as the small word is to the bigger word, as the living cell is to the 
organism, as the atom is to the cosmos. It is the small word of consciousness. The meaningful 
word is the microorganism of human consciousness. 
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